Jee-Hyeong Park

International trade disputes often involve the WTO as a third party that generates impartial opinions on potential violations when countries receive imperfect and private signals of violations. To identify the role that the WTO plays in enforcing trade agreements, this paper first explores what countries can achieve without the WTO by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies (PTS) under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately-obse

To analyse the role that the World Trade Organization (WTO) plays in enforcing international trade agreements, this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal <it>private trigger strategies</it> (<it>PTS</it>) under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an <it>explicit</it> tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country's concealed trade barriers. It identifies the condition u

This paper examines a labor market with two professional groups both cooperating and directly competing with each other: certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) and anesthesiologists (MDAs). We develop a model where the supply of MDAs endogenously determines (1) the earnings of CRNAs and MDAs, and (2) the extent of supervision of CRNAs by MDAs. We also analyze how MDAs may lobby to limit the scope of practice of CRNAs, and the resulting market equilibrium. Our theoretical model can be ap

Using WTO data on safeguard (SG) actions initiated during the period from 1995 to 2012, we empirically identify the factors that influence SG measure. Our analysis shows that most of the determinants emphasized by the existing studies perform their expected and statistically significant role in explaining the observed SG usage patterns across countries and industries. Countries take into consideration all factors that matter for SG measure, including potential retaliation threats, during initial

This article focuses on a less scrutinized aspect of the WTO dispute settlement system - non-litigated disputes. Legal rules concerning consultation and settlement during the panel proceedings are analysed with the case laws. We then propose, and empirically analyse, several key economic determinants of non-litigation in the WTO dispute settlement system that are motivated by the theory of bargaining with informational asymmetry. In particular, our logistic regressions show that a greater differ

Based on a modified Heckscher-Ohlin model of Deardorff and Park (2010 Deardorff, A. and Park, J.-H. 2010. A story of trade-induced industrialization. International Economic Journal, 24: 283–296. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]), this paper develops a dynamic model of trade-induced industrialization and economic growth. It shows that a developing country may grow out of its autarky steady state with no industrialization into a new steady state with full industrialization by opening t

An exploration of Korean MNCs' foreign affiliate-level data reveals that a significant portion of manufacturing foreign affiliates sell both to related and unrelated firms at the same time. We refer to this as hybrid vertical FDI. We rationalize the presence of hybrid vertical FDI by modifying the otherwise standard property-rights model of global sourcing with the subsidiary-level option of supplying inputs to unrelated customers in addition to related firms. Given the positive production exter

The GATT, which later became the WTO, has contributed to the expansion and activation of world trade by assisting trading partners to establish and enforce international trade rules through multilateral trade negotiations. Currently negotiations for new trade rules are contironing by launching Doha Round. This review intends to promote understanding of a basic analytical framework, upon which constructive debates and research have been conducted about the role of the WTO in the world trade regim

To analyze the role of pre-trial settlement in international trade dispute resolutions, this paper develops a simple model of trade and trade disputes in which a government is subject to private political pressure for protection, of which its trading partner receives imperfect private signal. As a way to enforce an optimal contingent protection agreement that maximizes the expected joint payoff of governments of trading countries, it considers and compares three alternative enforcement schemes,