Kyushu University · Business, Management and Accounting
Professor Konari Uchida's research lab focuses on corporate governance, capital structure, and investor behavior in Japanese firms, with a particular emphasis on the interplay between corporate finance, ownership structures, and market dynamics. The lab investigates how institutional arrangements—such as keiretsu affiliations, bank relationships, and board governance—shape financing decisions, executive compensation, and market responses to activist investors. It also explores the behavioral dimensions of online retail investing and the role of information networks in shaping investment decisions. The lab’s work bridges theoretical corporate finance with empirical evidence from Japanese markets, often highlighting institutional and cultural factors that differentiate Japan from Western corporate systems.
Figures are computed from collected data and may differ slightly.
Abstract Japanese data show a negative relation between leverage and the probability of firms' use of stock options. Such a relation is more marked for firms affiliated with specific keiretsu or main banks. This evidence reflects the fact that Japanese companies are more reliant on debt financing and that the agency cost of debt is a central issue in corporate governance. Results show that the frequency of the firms' use of stock options is positively associated with firm size. Finally, independ
We investigate causes and consequences of the emerging shareholder hostility in Japan. Steel Partners, an activist hedge fund based in San Francisco, takes big stakes in more than 30 Japanese firmsand pushes for strategic changes and sometimes tries to gain control of whole businesses. Meanwhile, Murakami Fund, a fresh Japanese activist fund, targets more than 40 firms. Steel Partner's targets typically have more cash but lower market valuations, whereas Murakami Fund is more likely to target ca
After controlling for the effect of parent banks’ (PBs) direct ownership, we find that investment by bank-affiliated venture capitals (BVCs) is positively associated with the probability that investee firms have loan balances with PBs in the year they issue an IPO. However, BVCs typically sell off their holdings of investee firms within 2 years after the IPO. Furthermore, the level of BVC ownership does not have explanatory power regarding whether investee firms have loans from PBs. On the contr
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