Takeo Hoshi

This paper presents evidence suggesting that information and incentive problems in the capital market affect investment. We come to this conclusion by examining two sets of Japanese firms. The first set has close financial ties to large Japanese banks that serve as their primary source of external finance and are likely to be well informed about the firm. The second set of firms has weaker links to a main bank and presumably faces greater problems raising capital. Investment is more sensitive to

We survey the macroeconomic stagnation and financial problems in Japan. The financial sector assessment includes separate analyses of the commercial banks, the life insurance companies and the government's fiscal investment and loan program (FILP). We estimate that the Japanese taxpayer will have to pay at least another ¥100 trillion (20% of GDP) to cover financial system losses. We explain how the current dysfunctional Japanese banking system misallocates funds by keeping many insolvent firms i

This paper explores the idea that financial distress is costly because free-rider problems and information asymmetries make it difficult for firms to renegotiate with their creditors in times of distress. We present evidence consistent with this view by showing Japanese firms with financial structures in which free-rider and information problems are likely to be small perform better than other firms in industrial groups-those with close financial relationships to their banks, suppliers, and cust

"First draft: June 1988--This draft: September 1988."--T.p.

We argue that the deregulation leading up to the Big Bang has played a major role in the current banking problems. This deregulation allowed large corporations to quickly switch from depending on banks to relying on capital market financing. We present evidence showing that large Japanese borrowers, particularly manufacturing firms, have already become almost as independent of banks as comparable U.S. firms. The deregulation was much less favorable for savers and consequently they mostly continu

As a result of deregulation, there was a dramatic shift during the 1980s in Japan away from bank debt financing towards public debt financing: in 1975, more than 90% of the corporate debt of public companies was bank debt; in 1992 it was less than 50%. This paper presents a theory of the choice between bank debt and public debt and then examines the theory using firm level data on borrowing sources in Japan. We find that high net worth companies are more prone to use public debt. We also find th

As a result of deregulation, there was a dramatic shift during the 1980s in Japan away from bank debt financing towards public debt financing: in 1975, more than 90% of the corporate debt of public companies was bank debt; in 1992 it was less than 50%. This paper presents a theory of the choice between bank debt and public debt and then examines the theory using firm level data on borrowing sources in Japan. We find that high net worth companies are more prone to use public debt. We also find th

During this decade the structure of corporate finance in Japan has changed dramatically. Japanese firms that once used bank debt as their prime source of financing now rely more heavily on the public capital markets. This trend was facilitated by the substantial deregulation of the Japanese capital markets. In an earlier paper (Moshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1988). we demonstrated that investment by firms with close bank relationships appears to be less liquidity constrained than investment by

During this decade the structure of corporate finance in Japan has changed dramatically. Japanese firms that once used bank debt as their prime source of financing now rely more heavily on the public capital markets. This trend was facilitated by the substantial deregulation of the Japanese capital markets. In an earlier paper (Moshi, Kashyap. and Scharfstein 1988). we demonstrated that investment by firms with close bank relationships appears to be less liquidity constrained than investment by

In this book Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap examine the history of the Japanese financial system, from its nineteenth-century beginnings through the collapse of the 1990s that concluded with sweeping reforms. Combining financial theory with new data and original case studies, they show why the Japanese financial system developed as it did and how its history affects its ongoing evolution. The authors describe four major periods within Japan's financial history and speculate on the fifth, into whic