[Paper Review] A Survey on Post-Quantum Cryptography: State-of-the-Art and Challenges

Marel Alvarado, Luke Gayler+3 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Dec 16, 2023

Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture4 citations

TL;DR

This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of post-quantum cryptography, distinguishing between quantum-resistant and quantum cryptography. It evaluates current state-of-the-art algorithms, assesses implementation challenges, and concludes that quantum-resistant cryptography is currently more viable than quantum cryptography due to practical limitations.

ABSTRACT

The paper explains that post-quantum cryptography is necessary due to the introduction of quantum computing causing certain algorithms to be broken. We analyze the different types of post-quantum cryptography, quantum cryptography and quantum-resistant cryptography, to provide a thorough understanding of the current solutions to the problems and their limitations. We explain the current state of quantum computing and how it has changed over time while discussing possible attacks on both types of post-quantum cryptography. Next, current post-quantum algorithms are discussed, and implementations are demonstrated. Lastly, we conclude that due to quantum cryptography's present limitations it is not a viable solution like it is often presented to be and that it is currently better to use quantum-resistant cryptography.

Motivation & Objective

• To analyze the current state of post-quantum cryptography in light of advancing quantum computing capabilities.
• To differentiate between quantum-resistant cryptography and quantum cryptography, evaluating their respective strengths and weaknesses.
• To assess the practical feasibility and implementation challenges of existing post-quantum algorithms.
• To evaluate potential attacks on both quantum-resistant and quantum-based cryptographic systems.
• To provide a conclusive assessment on the most viable path forward for post-quantum security in real-world applications.

Proposed method

• Systematic review and classification of post-quantum cryptographic approaches, including lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based schemes.
• Analysis of the current development stage and performance characteristics of leading post-quantum algorithms.
• Evaluation of implementation trade-offs such as key size, computational overhead, and side-channel resistance.
• Comparison of theoretical security assumptions with practical attack surfaces, including known cryptanalytic advances.
• Assessment of quantum cryptography's current limitations, such as infrastructure dependency and distance constraints.
• Synthesis of findings to determine the most practical and secure path forward for cryptographic migration.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 What are the primary categories of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, and how do they differ in security assumptions and performance?
• RQ2 How do current quantum computing developments threaten existing public-key cryptosystems like RSA and ECC?
• RQ3 What are the key practical limitations of quantum cryptography that hinder its widespread deployment?
• RQ4 How do quantum-resistant algorithms compare in terms of efficiency, standardization progress, and resistance to known attacks?
• RQ5 Which approach—quantum-resistant or quantum cryptography—offers a more viable and scalable solution for real-world systems today?

Key findings

• Quantum-resistant cryptography is currently more practical and deployable than quantum cryptography due to infrastructure and scalability constraints.
• Quantum cryptography, while theoretically secure, faces significant real-world limitations such as short transmission distances and high implementation costs.
• Lattice-based and code-based schemes show strong promise due to favorable performance and strong security proofs, with several under NIST standardization.
• Multivariate and isogeny-based schemes remain less mature, with concerns around key size and potential vulnerabilities to new cryptanalytic techniques.
• Side-channel attacks and implementation flaws remain critical risks even for standardized post-quantum algorithms.
• The transition to post-quantum cryptography requires careful migration planning, as legacy systems may not support new primitives without significant updates.