Cheol-young Kim

Amino acid derivatives of monascus pigments were produced by fermentation, and their antimicrobial activities were determined. Thirty-nine l- and d-forms of amino acids were added as a precursor to the fermentation medium for derivation of pigments. Derivatives with L-Phe, D-Phe, L-Tyr, and D-Tyr exhibited high activities against Gram(+) and Gram(-) bacteria with MIC values of c. 4-8 microg mL(-1). The control red pigment exhibited minimal inhibitory concentration (MIC) values higher than 32 mic

This article examines the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions: the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system. In the former system, the judge makes a decision based on her own acquired information, whereas in the latter system, the advocates are required to present their acquired information to the uninformed judge. Within the binary decision framework, I study the circumstances in which one system is superior to the other in terms of accuracy. The following two eff

ABSTRACT This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole ( ), to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.

This paper examines the properties of the two most commonly used legal institutions: the inquisitorial system and the adversarial system. In the former system, the judge makes a decision based on her own acquired information, whereas in the latter system, the advocates are required to present their acquired information to the uninformed judge. Within the binary decision framework, I study the circumstances in which one system is superior to the other in terms of accuracy. The following two effec

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasiongame framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On one hand, the litigant may consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to do so due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using her own experts advice. I show that the cost of expert advice is an imp

Shavell (2005) studied the optimality of minimum asset requirements within a frame-work in which individuals can influence the probability of an accident. We reinvestigate Shavellʼs model for the opposite accident scenario, in which individuals can influence the magnitude of harm, and find different policy implications. In particular, we show that it could be optimal to completely ban judgment-proof individuals from participating in a potentially harmful activity. We alsoexamine the effect of li