Youngwoo Koh

We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students’ attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on school-specific attributes such as essays. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alle

Spring-back of MS1470 steel sheets was numerically predicted using a non-linear kinematic hardening material behavior based on the Yoshida-Uemori model. From uniaxial tension and uniaxial tension-compression-tension data as well as the uniaxial tension-unloading-tension data, the parameters of the Yoshida-Uemori model were obtained. For the numerical simulations, the Yoshida-Uemori model was implemented into the commercial finite element program, ABAQUS/Explicit and ABAQUS/Standard using the use

Abstract We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint i

This study examines procurement auction with ex-ante identical firms. The buyer wishes to procure an innovation, the quality of which stochastically depends on firms` effort level. We analyze firms` optimal investment and bidding strategies and show that the buyer`s payoff is non-monotone for the number of firms in the auction. We show that the buyer benefits with many firms when the probabilities of high quality from different investment levels are close to each other or the cost of high effort

This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In the first chapter, we develop a model of decentralized college admissions in which students' preferences for colleges are uncertain, and colleges must incur costs when their enrollments exceed their capacities. Colleges' admission decisions then become a tool for strategic yield management, because the enrollment at a college depends on not only students' uncertain preferences but also other colleges' admission de