[论文解读] Recommendations for Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense

Mona Lange, Alexander Kott+7 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Mar 9, 2017

Scientific Computing and Data Management参考文献 29被引用 4

一句话总结

本文提出了一种基于模型的集成网络防御范式，通过应用系统工程原则，对从单个主机到企业级任务的复杂人机系统进行大规模建模。该范式通过可重用的、基于原则的模型，实现对网络威胁的系统性分析、漏洞缓解以及最优响应策略的制定，显著提升了防御各领域（如入侵检测、取证分析和恢复）之间的弹性与协同能力。

ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Exploratory Team meeting, "Model-Driven Paradigms for Integrated Approaches to Cyber Defense," was organized by the NATO Science and Technology Organization's (STO) Information Systems and Technology (IST) panel and conducted its meetings and electronic exchanges during 2016. This report describes the proceedings and outcomes of the team's efforts. Many of the defensive activities in the fields of cyber warfare and information assurance rely on essentially ad hoc techniques. The cyber community recognizes that comprehensive, systematic, principle-based modeling and simulation are more likely to produce long-term, lasting, reusable approaches to defensive cyber operations. A model-driven paradigm is predicated on creation and validation of mechanisms of modeling the organization whose mission is subject to assessment, the mission (or missions) itself, and the cyber-vulnerable systems that support the mission. This by any definition is a complex socio-technical system (of systems), and the level of detail of this class of problems ranges from the level of host and network events to the systems' functions up to the function of the enterprise. Solving this class of problems is of medium to high difficulty and can draw in part on advances in Systems Engineering (SE). Such model-based approaches and analysis could be used to explore multiple alternative mitigation and work-around strategies and to select the optimal course of mitigating actions. Furthermore, the model-driven paradigm applied to cyber operations is likely to benefit traditional disciplines of cyber defense such as security, vulnerability analysis, intrusion prevention, intrusion detection, analysis, forensics, attribution, and recovery.

研究动机与目标

• 通过用基于模型的方法替代临时性技术，解决网络防御中系统性、可重用方法的缺失问题。
• 实现对复杂人机系统（包括任务、组织和网络脆弱基础设施）的全面建模。
• 在统一的建模框架下整合多样化的网络防御领域，如入侵检测、取证分析和恢复。
• 通过在不同抽象层次上对多种缓解策略进行仿真与分析，支持决策制定。
• 通过形式化的建模标准，为长期、可扩展且互操作的网络防御运作建立基础。

提出的方法

• 开发一种基于模型的范式，以捕捉关键任务系统及其网络依赖关系的结构、功能和交互。
• 应用系统工程（SE）原则，在从主机级事件到企业级任务功能的多个抽象层次上对系统进行建模。
• 使用形式化建模技术，以一致且可分析的格式表示组织任务、系统组件和网络威胁。
• 集成基于模型的仿真，以评估替代缓解策略并识别最优防御措施。
• 在防御操作中重用模型，以增强一致性、减少冗余并提高响应协调性。
• 将建模框架与既有的网络防御领域对齐，包括漏洞分析、入侵防护和事件恢复。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 基于模型的范式如何提升网络防御策略的系统性设计与评估？
• RQ2 何种建模方法能够有效表示跨任务、系统和网络层级的复杂人机系统？
• RQ3 基于模型的分析在何种程度上可增强网络防御运作中的决策能力？
• RQ4 如何将可重用模型整合到传统网络防御领域（如入侵检测和取证分析）中？
• RQ5 在真实、关键任务的网络防御环境中，采用基于模型的方法面临哪些主要挑战？

主要发现

• 基于模型的方法通过形式化任务与系统依赖关系，显著提升了网络防御运作的系统性与可重用性分析能力。
• 将系统工程原则融入网络防御，实现了从主机事件到企业级任务的多抽象层次建模。
• 基于模型的仿真支持在多样化威胁场景下对缓解策略进行评估与优选。
• 该范式提升了入侵检测、取证分析和恢复等网络防御领域之间的协调性与互操作性。
• 可重用且经过验证的模型减少了对临时响应的依赖，支持长期、可扩展的网络弹性。
• 该方法为以结构化且可分析的方式应对复杂、大规模的网络防御挑战提供了原则性基础。