Jaewon Choi

Abstract We examine “reaching for yield” in U.S. corporate bond mutual funds. We define reaching for yield as tilting portfolios toward bonds with yields higher than the benchmarks. We find that funds generate higher returns and attract more inflows when they reach for yield, especially in periods of low-interest rates. Returns for high reaching-for-yield funds nevertheless tend to be negative on a risk-adjusted basis. Funds engage in rank-chasing behavior by reaching for yield, although these i

This paper shows empirically how asset risk and financial leverage interact to explain the equity risk dynamics of value versus growth stocks. During economic downturns, the asset betas and leverage of value firms increase, contributing to a sharp rise in equity betas. Asset betas of growth firms are much less sensitive to economic conditions, and, consistent with the tradeoff theory of capital structure, growth firms are also less levered, contributing to the relative stability of their equity

The convention in calculating trading costs in corporate bond markets is to assume that dealers provide liquidity to non-dealers (customers) and calculate average bid-ask spreads that customers pay dealers. We show that customers often provide liquidity in corporate bond markets, and thus, average bid-ask spreads underestimate trading costs that customers demanding liquidity pay. Compared with periods before the 2008 financial crisis, substantial amounts of liquidity provision have moved from th

The convention when calculating corporate bond trading costs is to estimate bid–ask spreads that customers pay, implicitly assuming that dealers always provide liquidity to customers. We show that, contrary to this assumption, customers increasingly provide liquidity following the adoption of post-2008 banking regulations, and thus, conventional bid–ask spread measures underestimate the cost of dealers’ liquidity provision. Among large trades wherein dealers use inventory capacity, customers pay

We examine dealers’ liquidity provision against mispricing in the corporate bond market from 2005 to 2009. Dealers on average serve as stabilizing liquidity providers by trading against widening price gaps between corporate bonds and credit default swaps (the CDS–bond basis). However, dealers cut back on liquidity provision as they suffer losses, mispricing becomes wider, or the funding situation worsens, consistent with the limited capital capacity of financial intermediaries. We also show that

Abstract We study whether firms spread out debt-maturity dates, which we call granularity of corporate debt. In our model, firms that are unable to roll over expiring debt need to liquidate assets. If multiple small asset sales are less inefficient than a single large one, it can be optimal to diversify debt rollovers across time. Using a large sample of corporate bond issuers during the 1991–2012 period, we establish novel stylized facts and evidence consistent with our model’s predictions. The