Sungkyunkwan University · Business, Management and Accounting
Professor Omrane Guedhami's research lab focuses on corporate governance, financial reporting quality, and the role of institutional mechanisms such as auditor choice and disclosure standards in mitigating agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors. The lab investigates how political connections, ownership concentration, and the separation of ownership and control affect corporate transparency, capital structure, and cost of equity. Using large-scale international datasets, the lab emphasizes empirical analysis of governance structures in emerging and developed markets, particularly in Asia and Western Europe.
Figures are computed from collected data and may differ slightly.
ABSTRACT We extend recent research on the links between political connections and financial reporting by examining the role of auditor choice. Our evidence that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor supports the intuition that insiders in these firms are eager to improve accounting transparency to convince outside investors that they refrain from exploiting their connections to divert corporate resources. In evidence consistent with another prediction
ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor‐related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other coun
Abstract We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital‐raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from nine Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control, while controlling for other firm‐level characteristics. This
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