[论文解读] Auditing Work: Exploring the New York City algorithmic bias audit regime

Lara Groves, Jacob Metcalf+3 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Feb 12, 2024

Taxation and Compliance Studies被引用 6

一句话总结

本论文通过访谈 16 位审计员，分析纽约市地方法案 144（LL 144），这是首个要求对雇佣中的 AEDTs 进行独立偏见审计的市政制度；评估可操作性、治理与政策含义；结果发现该制度因定义模糊、行业游说、准入障碍及审计员角色分歧而存在缺陷。

ABSTRACT

In July 2023, New York City (NYC) initiated the first algorithm auditing system for commercial machine-learning systems. Local Law 144 (LL 144) mandates NYC-based employers using automated employment decision-making tools (AEDTs) in hiring to undergo annual bias audits conducted by an independent auditor. This paper examines lessons from LL 144 for other national algorithm auditing attempts. Through qualitative interviews with 16 experts and practitioners within the regime, we find that LL 144 has not effectively established an auditing regime. The law fails to clearly define key aspects, such as AEDTs and independent auditors, leading auditors, AEDT vendors, and companies using AEDTs to define the law's practical implementation in ways that failed to protect job applicants. Contributing factors include the law's flawed transparency-driven theory of change, industry lobbying narrowing the definition of AEDTs, practical and cultural challenges faced by auditors in accessing data, and wide disagreement over what constitutes a legitimate auditor, resulting in four distinct 'auditor roles.' We conclude with four recommendations for policymakers seeking to create similar bias auditing regimes, emphasizing clearer definitions, metrics, and increased accountability. By exploring LL 144 through the lens of auditors, our paper advances the evidence base around audit as an accountability mechanism, providing guidance for policymakers seeking to create similar regimes.

研究动机与目标

• 评估纽约市 LL 144 下偏见审计的实际组成要素。
• 考察审计员、雇主、 AEDT 供应商和监管者之间的关系动态与激励。
• 刻画审计员的经验，以为更广泛的算法审计政策与实践提供信息。
• 评估 LL 144 如何塑造高风险招聘决策的问责机制。

提出的方法

• 对参与 LL 144 审计的 16 位专家和从业者进行定性访谈。
• 应用扎根理论从访谈稿中识别潜在主题与编码。
• 使用 Atlas.ti 进行编码，起始的 102 码代码簿并将其细化为 16 个代码。
• 分析公开评论与审计文献，以为访谈发现提供情境背景。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 RQ1：在此背景下，偏见审计的实际组成要素是什么？
• RQ2 RQ2：哪些关系动态与激励有助于形成有效的偏见审计机制？
• RQ3 RQ3：审计员的经验是什么，以及它们如何为更广泛的政策与实践提供信息？

主要发现

• 在 LL 144 下的审计主要是管理由该法的问责结构所创造的利益相关者关系动态。
• 不存在单一普遍认同的审计员角色；出现四类不同的审计员‘参与者’类别，提供不同的服务并造成分裂。
• 对于什么构成合格的审计员与审计实践存在强烈分歧，关于独立性和范围的辩论。
• 审计员在从雇主和 AEDT 供应商处获取数据方面面临重大的实际与文化障碍，影响审计质量和可行性。
• 在初始几个月内，审计报告的公开可及性有限，削弱透明度与问责性。
• 该法律以透明度驱动的变革理论被认为不足以阻止偏见的 AEDTs，且行业游说将法律的范围塑造成狭义的 AEDTs 定义。