[论文解读] Biocybersecurity -- A Converging Threat as an Auxiliary to War

Lucas Potter, Orlando Ayala+1 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Oct 1, 2020

Law, AI, and Intellectual Property参考文献 24被引用 6

一句话总结

本文提出生物网络防御（BCS）作为一种新型威胁途径，即通过网络手段对生物制剂进行武器化，从而实现同时利用生物技术和网络安全隐患的混合攻击。文章分析了若干假设的威胁路径（如通过数字系统递送基因工程病原体），并得出结论：BCS作为一种低成本、高影响的威胁，可作为战争的战略辅助手段，因此需要建立新的防御范式。

ABSTRACT

Biodefense is the discipline of ensuring biosecurity with respect to select groups of organisms and limiting their spread. This field has increasingly been challenged by novel threats from nature that have been weaponized such as SARS, Anthrax, and similar pathogens, but has emerged victorious through collaboration of national and world health groups. However, it may come under additional stress in the 21st century as the field intersects with the cyberworld -- a world where governments have already been struggling to keep up with cyber attacks from small to state-level actors as cyberthreats have been relied on to level the playing field in international disputes. Disruptions to military logistics and economies through cyberattacks have been able to be done at a mere fraction of economic and moral costs through conventional military means, making it an increasingly tempting means of disruption. In the field of biocybersecurity (BCS), the strengths within biotechnology and cybersecurity merge, along with many of their vulnerabilities, and this could spell increased trouble for biodefense, as novel threats can be synthesized and disseminated in ways that fuse the routes of attacks seen in biosecurity and cybersecurity. Herein, we offer an exploration of how threats in the domain of biocybersecurity may emerge through less foreseen routes as it might be an attractive auxiliary to conventional war. This is done through an analysis of potential payload and delivery methods to develop notional threat vectorizations. We conclude with several paradigms through which to view BCS-based threats.

研究动机与目标

• 探讨生物技术与网络安保的融合如何成为不对称战争的新前沿。
• 识别网络赋能的生物攻击可能绕过传统生物安保措施的新兴威胁路径。
• 评估生物网络防御威胁作为低成本替代传统军事行动的战略吸引力。
• 提出用于理解与缓解国家及全球安全背景下BCS威胁的概念框架。

提出的方法

• 分析现有网络与生物安保威胁，以识别数字操控可能促成生物攻击的交汇点。
• 通过建模假设的攻击链，将合成生物学与网络投送机制结合，构建假设的威胁路径。
• 利用已知网络攻击的类比和病原体传播动力学，评估有效载荷设计与传播路径。
• 将网络安保中的威胁建模技术应用于生物系统，重点关注隐蔽性、可扩展性与低可检测性。
• 基于意图、投送方式与技术可行性，提出对BCS威胁进行分类的概念范式。
• 综合生物防御、网络防御与双用途研究的见解，将BCS界定为一个独特但相互重叠的风险领域。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 网络能力如何被用于以隐蔽且可扩展的方式设计与部署生物工程威胁？
• RQ2 哪些可能的攻击路径会将数字系统被攻破与生物制剂传播相结合？
• RQ3 生物网络防御威胁在何种方式下可作为传统战争的战略辅助手段，尤其对非国家或非对称行为体而言？
• RQ4 生物技术与网络安保的漏洞如何交汇，从而制造新型且难以察觉的威胁情景？
• RQ5 为应对超越传统安全领域边界的混合生物网络威胁，需要哪些新的防御与政策框架？

主要发现

• 生物网络防御威胁代表了一类混合风险，即利用网络手段实现或增强生物攻击，从而开辟新的攻击面。
• 生物技术与网络基础设施的融合使得低成本、高影响的攻击成为可能，且可绕过传统的生物安保与网络防御机制。
• 潜在的攻击路径包括对合成生物学平台（如基因合成或实验室自动化系统）进行数字操控，以生产有害病原体。
• 该威胁对寻求以最小资源投入实现军事均势的国家与非国家行为体尤为令人担忧。
• 现有国际生物安保与网络安保框架不足以应对BCS威胁带来的独特挑战。
• 本文结论认为，必须建立新的概念与操作范式，以主动预见、检测和应对生物网络防御威胁。