[论文解读] Competitive ride-sourcing market with a third-party integrator

Yaqian Zhou, Hai Yang+3 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Aug 22, 2020

Transportation and Mobility Innovations参考文献 28被引用 6

一句话总结

本文提出一个博弈论模型，用于分析存在第三方整合者（聚合多个独立平台需求）的竞争性网约车市场。研究发现，平台整合通过减少匹配摩擦，能够提升总需求与社会福利，但当车辆供给充足或市场高度分散时，平台利润未必上升。

ABSTRACT

Recently, some transportation service providers attempt to integrate the ride services offered by multiple independent ride-sourcing platforms, and passengers are able to request ride through such third-party integrators or connectors and receive service from any one of the platforms. This novel business model, termed as third-party platform-integration in this paper, has potentials to alleviate the cost of market fragmentation due to the demand splitting among multiple platforms. While most existing studies focus on the operation strategies for one single monopolist platform, much less is known about the competition and platform-integration as well as the implications on operation strategy and system efficiency. In this paper, we propose mathematical models to describe the ride-sourcing market with multiple competing platforms and compare system performance metrics between two market scenarios, i.e., with and without platform-integration, at Nash equilibrium as well as social optimum. We find that platform-integration can increase total realized demand and social welfare at both Nash equilibrium and social optimum, but may not necessarily generate a greater profit when vehicle supply is sufficiently large or/and market is too fragmented. We show that the market with platform-integration generally achieves greater social welfare. On one hand, the integrator in platform-integration is able to generate a thicker market and reduce matching frictions; on the other hand, multiple platforms are still competing by independently setting their prices, which help to mitigate monopoly mark-up as in the monopoly market.

研究动机与目标

• 研究第三方平台整合对竞争性网约车市场效率与系统性能的影响。
• 比较整合与非整合市场情景下的系统表现，包括总需求、社会福利与平台利润。
• 分析在纳什均衡与社会最优条件下，整合与非整合情境下的均衡行为。
• 探究平台竞争与整合者协调如何共同影响市场摩擦与福利结果。

提出的方法

• 构建一个博弈论模型，其中多个网约车平台独立设定价格，而第三方整合者将乘客匹配至任意可用平台。
• 在两种情景下建模市场：(1) 无整合，乘客直接在各平台间选择；(2) 有整合，整合者聚合需求并将乘客分配至平台。
• 使用数学优化与均衡分析，研究纳什均衡与社会最优结果。
• 引入匹配摩擦与需求拆分效应，量化整合带来的效率增益。
• 运用比较静态分析，评估车辆供给与市场分散程度变化对系统性能的影响。
• 采用均衡条件与福利指标，评估社会福利与平台盈利能力之间的权衡。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 第三方平台整合如何影响竞争性网约车市场中的总实际需求？
• RQ2 与多个独立竞争平台的非整合市场相比，整合对社会福利有何影响？
• RQ3 在何种条件下，平台整合能带来单个平台利润的提升？
• RQ4 匹配摩擦与市场分散程度如何影响整合带来的效率增益？
• RQ5 在整合与非整合市场结构中，纳什均衡结果与社会最优结果有何比较？

主要发现

• 平台整合通过减少市场分散与提升匹配效率，增加了总实际需求。
• 在纳什均衡与社会最优条件下，整合市场的社会福利始终更高。
• 整合者通过创造更厚的市场，降低了匹配摩擦，实现更快、更可靠的乘车指派。
• 尽管效率有所提升，但当车辆供给充足或市场高度分散时，平台利润未必增加。
• 即使在整合下，平台间的竞争依然存在，有效抑制了垄断加价，维持了价格竞争。
• 模型表明，整合可提升系统效率，且无需协调平台定价策略。