[论文解读] Corporations and Regulators: The Game of Influence in Regulatory Capture

Dominic K. Albino, Anzi Hu+1 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Sep 30, 2013

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies参考文献 43被引用 4

一句话总结

本文提出一种新颖的博弈论框架，用于将监管俘获建模为公司与监管机构之间的战略互动，表明当公司收益超过监管成本时，合谋行为具有盈利性。研究发现，当收益与成本之比较大时，监管俘获极有可能发生，并强调影响力、透明度和制度设计如何塑造合谋与监管失败的激励机制。

ABSTRACT

In a market system, regulations are designed to prevent or rectify market failures that inhibit fair exchange, such as monopoly or transactions with hidden costs. Because regulations reduce profits to those possessing unfair advantage, these advantaged corporations (whether individuals, companies, or other collective organizations) are motivated to influence regulators. Regulatory bodies created to protect the market are instead co-opted to advance the interests of the corporations they are charged to regulate. This wide-spread influence, known as "regulatory capture," has been recognized for over 100 years, and according to expectations of rational behavior, will exist wherever it is in the mutual self-interest of corporations and regulators. Here we model the interaction between corporations and regulators using a new game theory framework explicitly accounting for players' mutual influence, and demonstrate the incentive for collusion. Communication between corporations and regulators enables them to collude and split the resulting profits. We identify when collusion is profitable for both parties. The intuitive results show that capture occurs when the benefits to the corporation outweigh the costs to the regulator. Under these conditions, the corporation can compensate the regulator for costs incurred and, further, provide a profit to both parties. In the real world, benefits often far outweigh costs, providing large incentives to collude and making capture likely. Regulatory capture is inhibited by decreasing the influence between parties through strict separation, independent market knowledge and research by regulators, regulatory and market transparency, regulatory accountability for market failures, widely distributed regulatory control, and anti-corruption enforcement.

研究动机与目标

• 将监管俘获建模为公司与监管机构之间的战略互动，考虑相互影响，而非假设参与者独立行动。
• 识别出公司与监管机构合谋变得有利可图且可持续的精确条件。
• 分析制度因素（如透明度、三权分立和反腐败执法）如何影响监管俘获的可能性。
• 放松理性假设，研究监管机构的诚信与自利行为如何影响俘获动态。
• 将监管影响力视为一种市场，其中影响力被买卖，进而对政策设计产生影响。

提出的方法

• 构建一个双人博弈论模型，其中公司与监管机构在相互影响下互动，影响力程度Δ ∈ [0,1]。
• 引入转移机制t，公司通过支付t以使监管机构偏向其利益，当t > 0且Δ ∈ (0,1)时可实现部分合谋。
• 推导出俘获的可行性条件：ΔB − ΔC > 0，或等价地，Δ > t/B 且 Δ < t/C（当t < C时）。
• 使用归一化利润度量ΔB − ΔC评估可行影响力范围的大小，范围越大表示合谋激励越强。
• 将影响力的有效价格建模为p = t/Δ，表明理性合谋要求C < t/Δ < B。
• 分析讨价还价动态，其中转移额t与影响力Δ共同决定利润分配，双方对利润分配比例具有相反偏好。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 在何种条件下，监管俘获对企业和监管机构均具有盈利性？
• RQ2 影响力程度Δ如何影响合谋可获得的总利润？在何种情况下部分影响力已足以实现俘获？
• RQ3 转移金额t在决定企业与监管机构之间合谋的可行性与稳定性方面发挥何种作用？
• RQ4 透明度、三权分立和反腐败执法等制度因素如何降低俘获的可能性？
• RQ5 监管机构与企业可通过何种方式战略性地操控影响力与沟通方式，以维持合谋安排？

主要发现

• 当公司收益（B）显著超过监管机构成本（C）时，监管俘获最可能发生，此时双方具有强烈的合谋激励。
• 当t/B较小时且t/C较大时，有利合谋的影响力Δ可行范围最大，表明在收益较大时，即使转移金额较小也能实现俘获。
• 当t < C时，监管机构可通过部分行使影响力（Δ < 1）降低实际风险，从而在承受低于自身成本的转移金额的同时仍能获利。
• 当B > C > 0时，合谋总利润ΔB − ΔC在Δ = 1时达到最大，意味着完全影响力可带来最高联合收益。
• 影响力的有效价格p = t/Δ必须满足C < p < B，理性交易才能发生，从而形成类似市场的影响力机制。
• 当监管机构表现出高敏感性（Δ较高）且企业竞争以获取有利监管决策时，影响力市场自然形成。