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[论文解读] How to Secure Distributed Filters Under Sensor Attacks

Xingkang He, Xiaoqiang Ren|arXiv (Cornell University)|Apr 11, 2020
Smart Grid Security and Resilience参考文献 44被引用 4
一句话总结

本文提出了一种针对线性时不变(LTI)系统在虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击下具有鲁棒性的递归分布式滤波器,采用两步法:首先使用类似饱和的创新滤波器以限制可疑测量的影响,随后通过一致性机制进行状态估计。主要贡献在于在攻击下可证明的有界估计误差,且当通过自适应阈值检测并排除被攻击的传感器时,性能得到提升。

ABSTRACT

We study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown subset of the sensors. We first propose a recursive distributed filter consisting of two steps at each update. The first step employs a saturation-like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation is large corresponding to a potential attack. The second step is a consensus operation of state estimates among neighboring sensors. We prove the estimation error is upper bounded if the filter parameters satisfy a condition. We further analyze the feasibility of the condition and connect it to sparse observability in the centralized case. When the attacked sensor set is known to be time-invariant, the secured filter is modified by adding an online local attack detector. The detector is able to identify the attacked sensors whose observation innovations are larger than the detection thresholds. Also, with more attacked sensors being detected, the thresholds will adaptively adjust to reduce the space of the stealthy attack signals. The resilience of the secured filter with detection is verified by an explicit relationship between the upper bound of the estimation error and the number of detected attacked sensors. Moreover, for the noise-free case, we prove that the state estimate of each sensor asymptotically converges to the system state under certain conditions. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate the developed results.

研究动机与目标

  • 设计一种分布式滤波器,确保在部分传感器遭受虚假数据注入(FDI)攻击时,估计误差保持有界。
  • 确定在保持滤波器稳定性的同时,最多可被FDI攻击的传感器数量。
  • 开发一种在线攻击检测机制,实现实时识别并减轻受损传感器的影响。

提出的方法

  • 滤波器采用两步递归过程:首先应用类似饱和的方案,降低大创新信号(指示潜在攻击)的增益,随后在相邻传感器之间执行状态估计的一致性操作。
  • 滤波器参数的设计满足一个条件,确保估计误差保持上界有界,该条件与集中式情况下的稀疏可观测性相关联。
  • 对于时不变的攻击集合,引入一种在线本地攻击检测器,利用检测阈值识别具有异常大创新信号的传感器。
  • 随着更多被攻击的传感器被识别,检测阈值自适应调整,从而缩小隐蔽攻击信号的空间,提升鲁棒性。
  • 该方法利用图连通性和一致性动态,收敛性分析基于由系统和网络参数导出的复合矩阵的施瓦茨(Schur)稳定性。
  • 理论分析采用类似李雅普诺夫的序列和递归界,证明在满足特定条件下,无噪声情况下估计误差可渐近收敛至零。

实验结果

研究问题

  • RQ1如何设计一种分布式滤波器,使其在时变部分传感器遭受FDI攻击时仍保持稳定和准确?
  • RQ2在确保滤波器估计误差有界的前提下,最多可被FDI攻击的传感器数量是多少?
  • RQ3如何实现实时检测被攻击的传感器,并有效减轻其在估计过程中的影响?

主要发现

  • 若滤波器参数满足与集中式情况下稀疏可观测性相关的条件,则估计误差可被严格上界限定。
  • 当检测到被攻击的传感器并将其排除后,估计误差的上界将与检测到的被攻击传感器数量成比例减小。
  • 在无噪声情况下,若所有被攻击的传感器最终均被检测到并将其测量值丢弃,则每个传感器的状态估计将渐近收敛至真实系统状态。
  • 随着更多被攻击传感器被检测,滤波器的鲁棒性得到提升,因为检测阈值自适应调整,从而缩小可能的隐蔽攻击信号集合。
  • 理论分析证实,当网络连通且所有攻击均被检测时,在复合系统矩阵满足施瓦茨(Schur)稳定性条件的假设下,估计误差可渐近收敛至零。
  • 数值仿真验证了理论结果,表明该滤波器在各种攻击场景下均能有效保持有界误差并实现收敛。

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