[论文解读] QBism, FAPP and the Quantum Omelette. (Or, Unscrambling Ontological Problems from Epistemological Solutions in QM)

Christian de Ronde|arXiv (Cornell University)|Aug 1, 2016

Quantum Mechanics and Applications参考文献 36被引用 3

一句话总结

本文批判了量子力学中本体论与认识论框架的混淆，认为'FAPP'（就所有实际用途而言）对退相干的辩护回避了关于量子到经典过渡的核心本体论问题。本文主张QBism作为一种连贯的认识论框架，通过拒绝物理实在论而代之以以代理为中心的概率，从而化解了某些本体论谜题，为解开'量子煎蛋'（quantum omelette）——即混合了形而上学与认识论解释的混乱——提供了可能。

ABSTRACT

In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic) subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present "quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes" (shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble -at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.

研究动机与目标

• 分析本体论与认识论在量子力学中持续混淆的历史与哲学根源。
• 批判退相干的'FAPP'辩护作为认识论上规避真实本体论问题（即量子到经典过渡问题）的手段。
• 为QBism作为一致的认识论框架辩护，该框架避免本体论承诺，同时解决基础性谜题。
• 主张即使在QBism等认识论解释提供有意义替代方案的情况下，本体论问题对基础物理学依然至关重要。
• 倡导在量子理论中更清晰地区分本体论与认识论层次，以防止概念混淆。

提出的方法

• 分析西方哲学与物理学中本体论与认识论之间的历史张力，追溯至前苏格拉底思想与柏拉图的形而上学。
• 审视'量子煎蛋'隐喻，作为对早期量子基础中混合本体-认识论解释（尤其是玻尔与海森堡工作）的批判。
• 评估FAPP类关于退相干的论点，将其视为未能解决量子到经典过渡背后本体论问题的认识论解决方案。
• 应用QBism的认识论贝叶斯框架，表明其通过将量子态视为个人信念程度、测量结果视为代理依赖，从而避免本体论承诺。
• 与近期对QBism的批评（例如[42, 47, 48]）展开对话，证明这些批评与QBism的内在一致性和哲学基础不相容。
• 主张QBism通过拒绝需要独立于代理的物理实在，从而化解本体论问题，因而解开了量子煎蛋的部分混乱。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 本体论与认识论的历史混淆如何塑造了量子力学的基础性争论？
• RQ2 为何FAPP类对退相干的辩护无法解决量子到经典过渡的本体论问题？
• RQ3 QBism在何种意义上提供了一个避免本体论承诺的连贯认识论框架？
• RQ4 如何反驳近期对QBism的本体论批评，这些批评错误地将其核心原则误解为实在论主张？
• RQ5 本体论探究在量子力学基础中扮演何种角色？为何必须将其与认识论分析区分开来？

主要发现

• 对退相干的FAPP辩护本质上是认识论的，无法解决量子力学如何涌现出经典世界这一核心本体论问题。
• ‘量子煎蛋’隐喻有效捕捉了在量子基础中混合本体论与认识论视角所引发的概念混乱。
• QBism提供了一个一致的认识论框架，将量子力学视为代理个人信念与预测的工具，从而化解了某些本体论谜题。
• QBism对近期本体论批评具有稳健性，因为这些批评错误地将QBism的奠基原则解读为实在论主张。
• 本文结论认为，尽管认识论方法如QBism具有重要价值，但本体论问题依然至关重要，且不应与认识论问题混淆于基础研究之中。