[论文解读] Simulating the conflict between reputation and profitability for online rating portals

Boris Galitsky, Mark Levene|arXiv (Cornell University)|Jun 28, 2004

Auction Theory and Applications参考文献 14被引用 5

一句话总结

本文通过建模一种在线评分门户网站的系统，模拟了声誉与盈利之间的张力，该系统通过订阅制服务评分获利，且门户网站每笔交易可提升评分。结果表明，若此类订阅模式未广泛采用，门户网站将面临声誉衰退与财务不稳定的双重风险，预测在线评分经济将从广告模式转向订阅模式。

ABSTRACT

We simulate the process of possible interactions between a set of competitive services and a set of portals that provide online rating for these services. We argue that to have a profitable business, these portals are forced to have subscribed services that are rated by the portals. To satisfy the subscribing services, we make the assumption that the portals improve the rating of a given service by one unit per transaction that involves payment. In this study we follow the "what-if" methodology, analysing strategies that a service may choose from to select the best portal for it to subscribe to, and strategies for a portal to accept the subscription such that its reputation loss, in terms of the integrity of its ratings, is minimised. We observe that the behaviour of the simulated agents in accordance to our model is quite natural from the real-would perspective. One conclusion from the simulations is that under reasonable conditions, if most of the services and rating portals in a given industry do not accept a subscription policy similar to the one indicated above, they will lose, respectively, their ratings and reputations, and, moreover the rating portals will have problems in making a profit. Our prediction is that the modern portal-rating based economy sector will eventually evolve into a subscription process similar to the one we suggest in this study, as an alternative to a business model based purely on advertising.

研究动机与目标

• 分析维护评分完整性与实现在线评分门户网站盈利之间战略冲突的机制。
• 建模订阅制评分操纵如何影响服务提供商的选择与门户网站声誉。
• 评估订阅制评分模式是否能在竞争性在线市场中同时维持盈利与可信度。
• 预测在不同商业模式下，在线评分系统的发展演化路径。

提出的方法

• 使用基于代理的模拟，建模竞争性服务与评分门户网站之间的互动。
• 假设门户网站每笔付费交易可将某项服务的评分提升一个单位，以模拟订阅激励机制。
• 采用“假设分析”方法，测试服务选择门户网站的策略以及门户网站接受订阅的策略。
• 以评分完整性衡量声誉损失，并通过交易收入衡量盈利水平。
• 模拟大多数服务与门户网站采用或拒绝订阅模式的情景。
• 分析不同采纳率下的结果，以评估系统的稳定性与可持续性。

实验结果

研究问题

• RQ1 订阅制评分系统如何影响在线评分门户网站的长期声誉？
• RQ2 当服务在具有不同订阅政策的评分门户网站之间选择时，会采取何种策略？
• RQ3 在何种条件下，订阅制模式可实现更高盈利而不损害评分完整性？
• RQ4 如果大多数门户网站和服务均未采用一致的订阅政策，整个生态系统将发生什么变化？
• RQ5 订阅制模式能否取代广告，成为在线评分门户网站的主导商业模式？

主要发现

• 若未广泛采纳订阅模式，评分门户网站将面临盈利与声誉完整性的双重风险。
• 订阅了评分被操纵的门户网站的服务可获得短期优势，但会危及整个系统的长期可信度。
• 在尽量减少声誉损失的同时接受订阅的门户网站可实现可持续盈利。
• 模拟结果表明，在现实市场条件下，从广告模式向订阅模式的转变是不可避免的。
• 若大多数门户网站和服务未采用相似的订阅政策，整个评分生态系统将面临系统性崩溃。
• 该模型预测，线上评分经济将演变为以订阅制为主的系统，以解决声誉与盈利之间的冲突。