Jong-Hyuk Lee

Elite selection in China has drawn significant attention given the importance of the country. Instead of relying on qualitative assessments from historical and personal insights, this study utilized machine-learning techniques to evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese elites. By incorporating over 251 individual features of 18,179 officials from 1982 to 2020, I built up an ensemble model to calculate the promotion probabilities of the previous Politburo members of the Communist Party of Chi

While it is widely recognized that a country’s bureaucratic structure significantly influences economic growth, its subnational variations remain relatively unexplored. To address this gap, this paper introduces a unique model to quantify the collective career incentives of subnational leadership in China. By adopting machine-learning techniques that incorporate 250 individual features, this study derives a predicted probability of promotion as a proxy to measure an official’s career prospects.

A thriving cottage industry has long tried to predict the selection outcomes of the Chinese leadership using qualitative judgments based on historical trends and elite interviews. This study contributes to the discourse by adopting machine-learning techniques to quantitatively and systematically evaluate the promotion prospects of Chinese high-ranking officials. By incorporating over 250 individual features of approximately 20,000 high-ranking positions from 1982 to 2020, this paper calculated p

In an authoritarian regime, the ruler faces a fundamental dilemma whereby the concentration of power increases the likelihood of subordinates distrusting the ruler. This study examines how Xi Jinping in China addresses this dilemma by sharing access-to-power positions with his central subordinates. By analyzing the promotion patterns of provincial officials from 1992 to 2021, this paper identifies Xi’s attempts to personalize provincial leadership by prioritizing his personal connections over co

The Chinese Communist Party has been surprisingly successful in carrying out its plans in the face of various challenges in the post-Mao era. Compared to their central counterparts, the operating patterns of local institutions in tackling such difficulties have been less examined. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring the party’s management of provincial standing committees (PSCs). As the highest level of local collective leadership, the PSC essentially sets the agenda for the province.