Jun Tanimoto 교수

A 2 x 2 game model implemented by a coevolution mechanism of both networks and strategy, inspired by the work of Zimmermann and Eguiluz [Phys. Rev. E72, 056118 (2005)] is established. Network adaptation is the manner in which an existing link between two agents is destroyed and how a new one is established to replace it. The strategy is defined as whether an agent offers cooperation (C) or defection (D) . Both the networks and strategy are synchronously renovated in a simulation time step. A ser

We propose a network reciprocity model in which an agent probabilistically adopts learning or teaching strategies. In the learning adaptation mechanism, an agent may copy a neighbor's strategy through Fermi pairwise comparison. The teaching adaptation mechanism involves an agent imposing its strategy on a neighbor. Our simulations reveal that the reciprocity is significantly affected by the frequency with which learning and teaching agents coexist in a network and by the structure of the network

A series of numerical simulations of a 2x2 symmetric game on a network examined whether payoff matrix noise promotes cooperation, as reported initially by Perc [New J. Phys. 8, 22 (2006)]. Agents have no memory (they offer cooperation, C, or defection, D). We assume that the network is time invariable. The effect of payoff matrix noise (PMN) is measured by a simulated payoff difference between a normal network game and a network game with PMN. The effect of PMN appears only when a local strategy

Unlike other natural network systems, assortativity can be observed in most human social networks; however, it has been reported that a social dilemma situation represented by a 2×2 prisoner's dilemma game favors dissortativity to enhance cooperation. Our simulations successfully reveal that a public goods game with coevolution for both agents' strategy and network topology encourages assortativity, although it only slightly enhances cooperation as compared to a 2×2 donor and recipient game with