Kyushu University · 경영학
Konari Uchida 교수의 연구실은 일본 기업의 거버넌스 구조와 자금조달 방식, 특히 주주 친화적 의사결정, 기업 지배구조의 변화, 그리고 투자자 행동에 중점을 두고 있습니다. 기업의 레버리지와 주식옵션 사용의 관계, 활동주의 투자자(Activist Investors)의 영향, 은행 연계 벤처캐피탈의 역할, 온라인 투자자 행동 등 다양한 측면에서 일본 특유의 기업문화와 금융 시스템의 상호작용을 분석하고 있습니다. 특히 기업의 이사회 규모 축소, 주주 가치 제고, 정보 비대칭 문제에 대한 기업의 자율적 대응 방식 등 실질적인 경영 전략의 효과성에 대한 깊이 있는 연구를 수행하고 있습니다.
표시된 성과는 수집된 데이터 기준으로 산출되며, 일부 차이가 있을 수 있습니다.
Abstract Japanese data show a negative relation between leverage and the probability of firms' use of stock options. Such a relation is more marked for firms affiliated with specific keiretsu or main banks. This evidence reflects the fact that Japanese companies are more reliant on debt financing and that the agency cost of debt is a central issue in corporate governance. Results show that the frequency of the firms' use of stock options is positively associated with firm size. Finally, independ
We investigate causes and consequences of the emerging shareholder hostility in Japan. Steel Partners, an activist hedge fund based in San Francisco, takes big stakes in more than 30 Japanese firmsand pushes for strategic changes and sometimes tries to gain control of whole businesses. Meanwhile, Murakami Fund, a fresh Japanese activist fund, targets more than 40 firms. Steel Partner's targets typically have more cash but lower market valuations, whereas Murakami Fund is more likely to target ca
After controlling for the effect of parent banks’ (PBs) direct ownership, we find that investment by bank-affiliated venture capitals (BVCs) is positively associated with the probability that investee firms have loan balances with PBs in the year they issue an IPO. However, BVCs typically sell off their holdings of investee firms within 2 years after the IPO. Furthermore, the level of BVC ownership does not have explanatory power regarding whether investee firms have loans from PBs. On the contr
