Md. Rajib Arefin 교수

What do corruption, resource overexploitation, climate inaction, vaccine hesitancy, traffic congestion, and even cancer metastasis have in common? All these socioeconomic and sociobiological phenomena are known as social dilemmas because they embody in one form or another a fundamental conflict between immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest. A shortcut to the resolution of social dilemmas has thus far been reserved solely for highly stylised cases reducible to dyadic games (e.

Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses-influenza A and B with several subtypes-that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine

Imitation and aspiration update rules are frequently observed in human and animal populations. While the imitation process entails payoff comparisons with surroundings, the aspiration process refers to self-evaluation. This work explores the evolution of cooperation in dyadic games under the coexistence of these two dynamics in an infinitely large well-mixed population. Two situations have been explored: (i) individuals adopt either an imitation or aspiration update rule with a certain probabili

Abstract We propose a mean-field vaccination game framework that combines two distinct processes: the simultaneous spreading of two strains of an influenza-like disease, and the adoption of vaccination based on evolutionary game theory presuming an infinite and well-mixed population. The vaccine is presumed to be imperfect such that it shows better efficacy against the original (resident) strain rather than the new one (mutant). The vaccination-decision takes place at the beginning of an epidemi

Feedback-evolving games characterize the interplay between the evolution of strategies and environments. Rich dynamics have been derived for such games under the premise of the replicator equation, which unveils persistent oscillations between cooperation and defection. Besides replicator dynamics, here we have employed aspiration dynamics, in which individuals, instead of comparing payoffs with opposite strategies, assess their payoffs by self-evaluation to update strategies. We start with a br

Vaccinating decisions can be influenced by imitation as well as self-evaluation or aspiration. This work analyses vaccinating behaviours by coupling both imitation and aspiration update rules, adopting an existing set-up of the mean-field vaccination game. We incorporate the imitation mechanism with several variants of the aspiration protocol, encompassing constant and adaptive aspirations. Equations of the combined dynamics have been derived by grouping the population according to (i) vaccinati

The COVID-19 pandemic has remarkably heightened concerns regarding the prediction of communicable disease spread. This study introduces an innovative agent-based modeling approach. In this model, the quantification of human-to-human transmission aligns with the dynamic variations in the viral load within an individual, termed "within-host" and adheres to the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) process, referred to as "between-host." Variations in the viral load over time affect the infectivity

Abstract Imitation and aspiration learning rules are frequently observed in humans and animals. The former is an act of copying other’s action, whereas the latter is characterized by the self-evaluation. Here we study the coexistence of these learning mechanisms in structured populations. Both rules have been combined focusing on two different scenarios: (I) adoption of either update rule with a certain probability, and (II) grouping the entire population according to the update rules. We presen

In this paper, we present additive algorithm for solving a class of 0-1 integer linear fractional programming problems (0-1 ILFP) where all the coefficients at the numerator of the objective function are of same sign. The process is analogous to the process of solving 0-1 integer linear programming (0-1 ILP) problem but the condition of fathoming the partial feasible solution is different from that of 0-1 ILP. The procedure has been illustrated by two examples. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/duj

This paper deals with minimizing average of loss functions using Gradient Descent (GD) and Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). We present these two algorithms for minimizing average of a large number of smooth convex functions. We provide some discussions on their complexity analysis, also illustrate the algorithms geometrically. At the end, we compare their performance through numerical experiments. Dhaka Univ. J. Sci. 64(2): 141-145, 2016 (July)