성균관대학교 · 경영학
오르네 가우드라미 교수의 연구실은 기업 지배구조, 회계 투명성, 소액주주 보호를 중심으로 한 금융 및 회계 분야의 핵심 문제를 다룹니다. 정치적 네트워크가 재무보고 품질에 미치는 영향, 감사사 선택이 기업의 투명성과 소액주주 보호에 어떻게 기여하는지, 그리고 지배주주와 경영진 간의 권한 분리가 자본 조달 비용에 어떤 영향을 미치는지를 중심으로 연구합니다. 특히 제도적 환경과 감사의 역할이 기업의 소유 집중도와 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 다각도로 분석합니다.
표시된 성과는 수집된 데이터 기준으로 산출되며, 일부 차이가 있을 수 있습니다.
ABSTRACT We extend recent research on the links between political connections and financial reporting by examining the role of auditor choice. Our evidence that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big 4 auditor supports the intuition that insiders in these firms are eager to improve accounting transparency to convince outside investors that they refrain from exploiting their connections to divert corporate resources. In evidence consistent with another prediction
ABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor‐related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other coun
Abstract We investigate whether the separation between ownership and control rights can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of capital‐raising costs. Using estimates of the cost of equity capital implied by analyst earnings forecasts and growth rate for a sample of 1,207 firms from nine Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find strong, robust evidence that the cost of equity is increasing in excess control, while controlling for other firm‐level characteristics. This
