[Paper Review] Fundamental Theories and Epistemic Shifts: Can History of Science Serve as a Guide?

Helge Kragh|arXiv (Cornell University)|Feb 18, 2017

Science and Climate Studies18 citations

TL;DR

This paper argues that history of science offers indirect but valuable guidance for contemporary debates on the demarcation between science and non-science, particularly regarding foundational theories like string theory and multiverse cosmology. By analyzing past epistemic shifts in theory assessment, Kragh contends that historical reflection helps contextualize current challenges to empirical testability, supporting a nuanced understanding of scientific legitimacy beyond rigid criteria.

ABSTRACT

The present discussion concerning certain fundamental physical theories (such as string theory and multiverse cosmology) has reopened the demarcation problem between science and non-science. While parts of the physics community see the situation as a beginning epistemic shift in what defines science, others deny that the traditional criterion of empirical testability can or should be changed. As demonstrated by the history of physics, it is not the first time that drastic revisions of theory assessment have been proposed. Although historical reflection has little to offer modern physicists in a technical sense, it does offer a broader and more nuanced perspective on the present debate. This paper suggests that history of science is of some indirect value to modern physicists and philosophers dealing with string theory, multiverse scenarios, and related theoretical ideas.

Motivation & Objective

• To investigate whether historical precedents of theory assessment shifts can inform current debates on the scientific status of fundamental theories like string theory and multiverse cosmology.
• To address the ongoing demarcation problem between science and non-science in theoretical physics.
• To evaluate the epistemic legitimacy of theories that lack empirical testability, using historical analogies.
• To demonstrate that history of science, while not providing technical solutions, offers a broader philosophical and contextual framework for understanding epistemic change.
• To contribute to the conference theme 'Why Trust a Theory?' by analyzing trust in theoretical physics through historical lenses.

Proposed method

• Analytical historical review of past epistemic shifts in physics, focusing on theory assessment criteria.
• Use of case studies from the history of physics to identify patterns of theoretical legitimacy under changing standards.
• Philosophical analysis of the concept of 'empirical testability' and its evolution in scientific practice.
• Interpretation of historical episodes as analogues to current debates on string theory and multiverse scenarios.
• Synthesis of historical insights into a framework for evaluating modern theoretical physics.
• Invited conference presentation format, integrating historical narrative with philosophical argumentation.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 Can historical episodes of theory assessment change provide insight into the current debate on the scientific status of string theory?
• RQ2 To what extent do past epistemic shifts in physics parallel the present challenges to empirical testability?
• RQ3 How can history of science inform the criteria for distinguishing science from non-science in fundamental physics?
• RQ4 What role does historical reflection play in legitimizing theories that lack direct empirical confirmation?
• RQ5 In what ways do past transitions in scientific legitimacy anticipate or parallel today’s theoretical debates?

Key findings

• Historical episodes show that drastic revisions in theory assessment criteria have occurred before, such as in the development of quantum mechanics and relativity.
• The history of science reveals that empirical testability has not always been the sole or primary criterion for scientific legitimacy.
• Epistemic shifts in theory evaluation are not unprecedented, suggesting that current debates are part of a longer-standing pattern in scientific development.
• While history does not offer technical solutions, it provides a broader, more nuanced perspective on the legitimacy of theoretical physics.
• The paper concludes that history of science can indirectly guide modern physicists and philosophers in evaluating theories like string theory and multiverse cosmology.
• The argument supports a more flexible understanding of scientific criteria, acknowledging that trust in theory can be epistemically justified even without immediate empirical confirmation.