[Paper Review] The geopolitics behind the routes data travels: a case study of Iran

Loqman Salamatian, Frédérick Douzet+2 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Nov 18, 2019

Opportunistic and Delay-Tolerant Networks27 references4 citations

TL;DR

This paper analyzes Iran's Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing strategies to reveal how geopolitical objectives shape data transmission routes. Using BGP data and network analysis, it identifies three strategic uses: building a self-sustaining national internet, enabling centralized censorship via an Iranian Intranet, and leveraging connectivity for regional influence, demonstrating how network architecture reflects state-level strategic goals in cyberspace.

ABSTRACT

The global expansion of the Internet has brought many challenges to geopolitics. Cyberspace is a space of strategic priority for many states. Understanding and representing its geography remains an ongoing challenge. Nevertheless, we need to comprehend Cyberspace as a space organized by humans to analyse the strategies of the actors. This geography requires a multidisciplinary dialogue associating geopolitics, computer science and mathematics. Cyberspace is represented as three superposed and interacting layers: the physical, logical, and informational layers. This paper focuses on the logical layer through an analysis of the structure of connectivity and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). This protocol determines the routes taken by the data. It has been leveraged by countries to control the flow of information, and to block the access to contents (going up to full disruption of the internet) or for active strategic purposes such as hijacking traffic or attacking infrastructures. Several countries have opted for a BGP strategy. The goal of this study is to characterize these strategies, to link them to current architectures and to understand their resilience in times of crisis. Our hypothesis is that there are connections between the network architecture shaped through BGP, and strategy of stakeholders at a national level. We chose to focus on the case of Iran because, Iran presents an interesting BGP architecture and holds a central position in the connectivity of the Middle East. Moreover, Iran is at the center of several ongoing geopolitical rifts. Our observations make it possible to infer three ways in which Iran could have used BGP to achieve its strategic goals: the pursuit of a self-sustaining national Internet with controlled borders; the will to set up an Iranian Intranet to facilitate censorship; and the leverage of connectivity as a tool of regional influence.

Motivation & Objective

• To understand how national-level strategic goals are encoded in BGP routing architectures.
• To investigate how Iran’s network infrastructure reflects geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East.
• To analyze the role of BGP in enabling state control over data flows, including censorship and traffic manipulation.
• To assess the resilience and strategic design of Iran’s internet architecture under geopolitical pressure.

Proposed method

• Collection and analysis of BGP routing data from Iran and neighboring regions.
• Mapping of inter-AS (autonomous system) connections to identify routing patterns and control points.
• Identification of BGP hijacking events and route manipulation to infer strategic intent.
• Use of network topology analysis to assess the structure and resilience of Iran’s internet connectivity.
• Cross-referencing routing behavior with known geopolitical events and state policies.
• Application of a three-layer model (physical, logical, informational) to frame the analysis of cyberspace as a geopolitical construct.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 How does Iran’s BGP routing architecture reflect its strategic goals in cyberspace?
• RQ2 In what ways has Iran used BGP to control or manipulate data flows for national security or censorship purposes?
• RQ3 To what extent is Iran’s internet infrastructure designed for autonomy and resilience during geopolitical crises?
• RQ4 How does Iran leverage its position in regional connectivity to exert influence over neighboring states?
• RQ5 What evidence exists of BGP-based traffic manipulation or hijacking linked to state policy?

Key findings

• Iran has developed a BGP routing architecture that enables a form of self-sustaining national internet with controlled external connections.
• The country has implemented routing strategies consistent with the creation of a national Intranet, facilitating centralized content filtering and censorship.
• Iran has engaged in BGP hijacking events that suggest active manipulation of data paths for strategic or disruptive purposes.
• Iran’s network structure reveals a deliberate design to minimize reliance on Western transit providers, enhancing strategic autonomy.
• The country’s connectivity patterns indicate a focus on regional dominance, using internet infrastructure as a tool of influence in the Middle East.
• Analysis shows that Iran’s BGP behavior reflects a coordinated strategy combining technical control, resilience, and geopolitical leverage.