[論文レビュー] Political influence and corporate profits: a study of Hungarian firms

Zoltan Bartha|arXiv (Cornell University)|Feb 22, 2026

Cooperative Studies and Economics被引用数 0

ひとこと要約

要約: 本論文は、2008–2012年と2019–2023年の間にハンガリーの1000社の最大企業の利益分配を比較し、2010年代における政治的な租税的圧力（rent seeking）を評価し、増加した租税が生じているセクターを特定し、チェコ企業と比較して結果を対比する。

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the extent of political rent seeking in Hungary in the 2010s. Political capitalism--where powerful private interests influence public policy for private gain--creates opportunities for rent seeking that vary across sectors. The analysis is based on a theoretical model assuming rent seeking occurs in a three-stage process: changes in economic institutions granting regulatory privileges, which are enhanced by political-business networks; this leads to scarcities, and increased market power in certain markets; which then generates rents. To quantify this, the study evaluates Hungarian political capitalism by examining the impact of political decisions on firms' rents, analysing the profit trends of the 1,000 largest Hungarian firms (selected annually by net sales) and comparing their mean profit share (earnings before tax) across two periods: 2008-2012 and 2019-2023. A significant increase in a sector's mean profit share was assumed to indicate increased rent seeking. Using Welch's two-sample t-tests, three sectors were identified as potentially experiencing increased rent seeking: agriculture, construction, and financial and insurance activities. Quantitative findings include a 320% increase in mean agricultural profit share (70% in mean ROA), a more than fivefold increase in construction mean profit share (mean ROA from 3.3% to 10.1%), and a more than 6.5 times increase in financial sector mean profit share. Furthermore, a similar Czech analysis showed no significant increases in any sector's profit share, suggesting that the detected rises in Hungarian sectors are linked to domestic activities rather than external factors, which strengthens the findings.

研究の動機と目的

• Investigate the extent of political rent seeking in Hungary during the 2010s.
• Model how political decisions, regulatory privileges, and business networks translate into rents.
• Quantify sectoral changes in firm profits to infer Rent-Seeking dynamics.
• Compare Hungarian results with Czech data to distinguish domestic versus external drivers.

提案手法

• Propose a three-stage theoretical model: regulatory changes, political-business networks, leading to scarcity and market power, then rents.
• Analyze profit trends of the 1,000 largest Hungarian firms (by net sales) across two periods: 2008–2012 vs 2019–2023.
• Use mean profit share (earnings before tax) as a proxy for rents and compare across sectors.
• Apply Welch’s two-sample t-tests to identify sectors with significant increases in mean profit share.
• Contrast Hungarian sector results with a Czech analysis to assess domestic versus external factors.

実験結果

リサーチクエスチョン

• RQ1 Does political capitalism explain increases in sectoral firm profits in Hungary between 2008–2012 and 2019–2023?
• RQ2 Which sectors show evidence of increased rent seeking according to changes in mean profit shares?
• RQ3 Is the observed rise in Hungarian sector profits driven by domestic factors, or external (Czech) influences?
• RQ4 How do regulatory privileges and political-business networks translate into observable profit gains for large Hungarian firms?

主な発見

• Agriculture shows a 320% increase in mean profit share (70% mean ROA).
• Construction shows more than a fivefold increase in mean profit share, with mean ROA rising from 3.3% to 10.1%.
• Financial and insurance activities show more than a 6.5 times increase in mean profit share.
• A Czech analysis shows no significant increases in any sector’s profit share, suggesting domestic factors drive the Hungarian results.