Deng Natalja

Abstract Usually, the B ‐theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B ‐theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B ‐theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, I examine t

Abstract I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A‐theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B‐theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A‐theories, suggests more than coherent A‐theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture req

ABSTRACT: What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John

This book is unusual in its breadth. It is a collection of original essays by metaphysicians, philosophers of mind, and philosophers of religion, loosely grouped into three parts: ‘Metaphysics and ...

In his recent book ‘Experiencing time’ (OUP), Simon Prosser discusses a wide variety of topics relating to temporal experience, in a way that is accessible both to those steeped in the philosophy of mind, and to those more familiar with the philosophy of time. He forcefully argues for the conclusion that the B-theorist of time can account for the temporal appearances. In this article, I offer a chapter by chapter response.

The God of Western religion is said to be eternal. But what does that mean? Is God somehow beyond time, living a life that does not involve one thing after another? Or is God's relationship to time much more like ours, so that God's eternality just consists in there being no time at which God doesn't exist? Even for non-believers, these issues have interesting implications for the relation between historical and scientific findings on the one hand, and religion on the other. This Element introdu

Both (Gruber, Block, & Montemayor, 2022) and (Buonomano & Rovelli, 2021) contain interesting interdisciplinary proposals for how to think about the relation between humans' experience of time and what time is like. This is a complex topic. Tackling it requires confronting difficult questions about (i) which features of experience and which features of time are difficult to fit together (if any), (ii) which discipline(s) should attempt the required explanation(s) (if any), and (iii) what these ex

This chapter provides an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al, distinguishes between two B-theoretic responses to the A-theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. It argues for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. The chapter suggests that the deflationary view can provide support for veridicalism. In saying that the content of temporal experience is partly A-theoretic, the veridicalis