JooYoung Lee
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology · 情報科学
研究室紹介
Professor JooYoung Lee's research lab specializes in cryptographic systems and secure protocols, with a strong focus on key management, authenticated key exchange, and the security analysis of cryptographic primitives. The lab investigates combinatorial designs for efficient and resilient key predistribution in sensor networks, while also advancing the formal security proofs of fundamental cryptographic constructions such as compression functions and hash functions. Research spans theoretical foundations and practical applications, emphasizing provable security under standard assumptions like the computational Diffie-Hellman and random oracle models. The lab is particularly known for developing novel proof techniques and improving the security guarantees of widely used cryptographic schemes.
Research Overview
Research Output Trend
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Selected Papers
15In this paper, we discuss the use of combinatorial set systems (combinatorial designs) in the design of key predistribution schemes (KPSs) for sensor networks. We show that the performance of a KPS can be improved by carefully choosing a certain class of set systems as “key ring spaces”. Especially, we analyze KPSs based on a type of combinatorial design known as a <it>transversal design</it>. We employ two types of transversal designs, which are represented by the set of all linear
We discuss the use of combinatorial set systems in the design of deterministic key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks. We concentrate on analyzing combinatorial properties of the set systems that relate to the connectivity and resilience of the resulting distributed sensor networks.
Abstract. In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol and prove its security under the random oracle assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, there has been no known AKE protocol based on the CDH assumption. Our protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. We establish a formal security proof of NAXOS+ in the extended Canetti-Kr
As old as Tandem-DM, the compression function Abreast-DM is one of the most well-known constructions for double block length compression functions. In this paper, we give a security proof for Abreast-DM in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance. The bounds on the number of queries for collision resistance and preimage resistance are given by Ω(2n). Based on a novel technique using query-response cycles, our security proof is simpler than those for MDC-2 and Tandem-DM. We also pres
In this paper, we analyze collision resistance of the JH hash function in the ideal primitive model. The JH hash function is one of the five SHA-3 candidates accepted for the final round of evaluation. The JH hash function uses a mode of operation based on a permutation, while its security has been elusive even in the random permutation model. One can find a collision for the JH compression function only with two backward queries to the basing primitive. However, the security is significantly en
Abstract. In this paper, we give a security proof for Abreast-DM in terms of collision resistance and preimage resistance. As old as Tandem-DM, the compression function Abreast-DM is one of the most well-known constructions for double block length compression functions. The bounds on the number of queries for collision resistance and preimage resistance are given by O (2 n). Based on a novel technique using query-response cycles, our security proof is simpler than those for MDC-2 and Tandem-DM.