Kangwook Han

While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically change the priorities of autocratic policies to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more money on redistributive policies in election periods. Using budgetary spending data

This study analyzes how political leaders’ material backgrounds affect redistributive policies in democracies. Building on political socialization theory, we argue that politicians with personal experience of economic hardship are more likely to have sympathetic attitudes toward redistribution than those without such experience, particularly where political constraints are weak. We posit that firsthand knowledge of economic hardship helps political leaders understand why the poor need government

While numerous studies have explored the foundations of autocratic stability by focusing on macroeconomic variables, the micro-foundations of autocratic support have largely been overlooked. Using Afrobarometer survey data from 22 African autocracies, I examine how dictators stabilize their rule even during economic recessions. I find that the provision of welfare benefits alleviates the adverse impact of negative economic perceptions on support for the dictator. Citizens are likely to continue

Do political leaders influence the level of economic inequality in authoritarian countries? Building on previous studies on political leaders and authoritarian regimes, we argue that economic inequality is likely to decrease during the tenure of authoritarian leaders with personal experiences of economic hardship. Since authoritarian leaders have greater policy discretion than their democratic counterparts, their policy choices are less constrained by other political actors and institutions. As

Abstract While political leaders’ role in foreign policy choices has received increasing scholarly attention, surprisingly less is known about how they affect the allocation and distribution of official development aid. This study examines how the material background of political leaders influences their aid allocation strategies in donor countries. We contend that leaders with economic hardship experience distribute more foreign aid than those without such experience. Through socialization, lea

Abstract While previous studies have examined the factors contributing to the appointment of women in government cabinets, few have investigated the role of political leaders in promoting women's cabinet representation. Drawing on political socialization theory, we argue that political leaders from economically disadvantaged backgrounds are more inclined to appoint female members to ministerial positions than their wealthier counterparts. This propensity stems from leaders’ personal experiences

제3의 민주화 물결 이후, 많은 신생 민주주의 국가들이 대통령제를 도입하였다. 기존의 비교정치학 연구들은 강한 대통령제가 초래하는 결과들에 주목해왔으나 대통령 권력 강화의 원인에 대한 분석은 상대적으로 소홀하게 다뤄졌다. 본 연구는 권위주의 체제하에서의 선거 경쟁성이라는 요인에 초점을 맞추어 권위주의적 정치 유산이 민주화 이후 대통령제 하에서 대통령 권력 비대화에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 한다. 본 연구는 권위주의 체제에서의 높은 선거 경쟁 수준이 민주화 이후 강한 대통령 권력과 관련이 있다는 가설을 제시한다. 권위주의 시기부터 존재하던 정당들이 조직을 운영하고, 정치적 기득권을 유지하기 위해 강한 대통령제를 선호하기 때문이다. 1975년부터 2019년까지 민주화를 경험한 전 세계 42개 대통령제 국가에 대한 분석 결과는 이러한 이론적 주장을 뒷받침한다.

While political budgetary cycles in democracies have been rigorously studied for the past several decades, surprisingly little is known about electorally motivated policy manipulation in authoritarian regimes. This study analyzes how dictators strategically change the priorities of autocratic policies to cultivate electoral dominance even when election results are predetermined. I argue that dictators spend more money on redistributive policies in election periods. Using budgetary spending data

While political leaders’ role in foreign policy choices has received increasing scholarly attention, surprisingly less is known about how they affect the allocation and distribution of official development aid. This study examines how the material background of political leaders influence their aid allocation strategies in donor countries. We contend that leaders with economic hardship experience distribute more foreign aid than those without such experience. Through socialization, leaders with

본 연구는 지방의회의 청렴도가 의정비 결정에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석한다. 한국의 지방의회는 외부 인사로 구성된 의정비심의위원회가 의정비를 결정하지만, 실제로는 의회의 영향력이 일정 부분 작동할 수 있는 제도적 구조를 지니고 있다. 이러한 조건 속에서 청렴도는 제도 내 자기규율(self-regulation)과 절제력을 반영하는 핵심 지표로 기능하며, 의정비 결정의 수준과 방향에 실질적인 영향을 미칠 가능성이 있다. 2014년부터 2022년까지 전국 17개 광역의회를 대상으로 한 결과, 청렴도가 높을수록 지역내 1인당 소득 대비 의정비 비율이 유의미하게 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 청렴도가 높은 의회일수록 지역의 경제 상황을 고려해 의정비 인상을 자제하고, 자기보상적 행위를 억제하는 제도적 규율이 작동함을 의미한다. 본 연구는 청렴도가 제도적 신뢰와 정치적 책임성(political accountability)의 핵심 조건임을 실증적으로 제시함으로써, 지방의회 개혁과 신뢰 회복을