Minghun Kang
Pohang University of Science and Technology · 社会科学
研究室紹介
Professor Minghun Kang's research lab specializes in formal modeling of legislative politics, presidential power, and media dynamics in democratic institutions. The lab investigates how institutional rules—such as supermajority voting, separation of powers, and electoral incentives—affect lawmaking gridlock, presidential unilateralism, and legislative accountability. It also explores the role of partisanship, misinformation, and media skepticism in shaping policy outcomes and democratic deliberation. By combining game-theoretic models with empirical analysis of roll-call votes and legislative networks, the lab advances theoretical and practical insights into institutional design and foreign policy coordination.
Research Overview
Research Output Trend
Figures are computed from collected data and may differ slightly.
Selected Papers
12Abstract I develop a formal model that investigates conditions under which the president acts unilaterally to establish a given policy. The key innovation is that unilateral action is considered a costly tool for voter mobilization. Presidential unilateral action activates voters' constitutional concerns, which increases the cost of voting and leads the president's supporters to abstain. However, it also provides extra expressive benefits of voting to the president's supporters who deeply care a
Abstract Deceiving citizens is typically considered the main political motive behind the spread of fake news. Accordingly, strategies to debunk fake news, such as fact-checking, have been suggested to combat it. However, the spread of fake news persists despite these debunking strategies. We propose an alternative but underexplored motive behind the spread of fake news: Fake news aims not only to deceive citizens but also to induce media skepticism. To support our claim, we present a stylized fo
Congress’s power of the purse is effective enough to block the implementation of a policy Congress disagrees with, especially in the case of foreign policies initiated by presidents. However, it is puzzling that congressional deference to presidents, instead of defiance, has been common. Conventionally, presidents’ informational advantages over Congress have been presented as the main account for congressional deference. This account connotes that congressional deference is Congress’s surrender
We propose a formal model that investigates the institutional cause of the expansion of the gridlock region in a legislative body under supermajority rule. We show that the interaction between a legislative election and the supermajority rule in the legislative policy-making process causes an expansion of the size of the gridlock region under certain circumstances. More specifically, if the position of the status quo is neither too moderate nor too extreme, then certain voters will be incentiviz
We propose a formal model that investigates the institutional cause of the expansion of the gridlock region in a legislative body under supermajority rule. We show that the interaction between a legislative election and the supermajority rule in the legislative policy-making process causes an expansion of the size of the gridlock region under certain circumstances. More specifically, if the position of the status quo is neither too moderate nor too extreme, then certain voters will be incentiviz
Abstract This chapter explores the relationship between voter (de)mobilization and electoral integrity. While voter mobilization is essential for increasing turnout and ensuring fair representation, selective strategies that target specific groups or demobilize opposition can undermine electoral integrity. Using the calculus of voting framework, the chapter analyzes how political actors manipulate the perceived costs and benefits of voting to prioritize partisan gains over equitable participatio
This dissertation examines how separation of powers and competitive elections affect the policymaking process at its various stages. First, I explore how the super-majoritarian rule in the legislature, which is the consequence of separation of powers, affects votersˆa electoral decisions, which in turn indirectly affects the policy outcome. I demonstrate that the super-majoritarian rule of the legislative policymaking process creates not only a legislative gridlock but also incentives that lead
It is widely known that partisan attitudes drive individuals to mistakenly believe misleading information is true, resulting in the spread of misleading information. It is also possible that partisan attitudes create a gap between belief and behavior. That is, partisan attitudes lead individuals to spread misleading information even if they know that it is unlikely to be true. However, the latter possibility has not been closely examined. This study aims to fill this lacuna. We find evidence tha
최근 미 · 중 경쟁이 격화되고 경제 안보가 화두로 떠오른 맥락에서 미국 바이든 정부는 입법 정치를 통한 외교 정책 형성에 주력하고 있다. 미국 의회가 법으로 통과시키는 미국 대외 정책은 그 파급력을 무시하기 어렵기 때문에 미국 의회의 동향을 민감하게 파악하고 대응책을 세우는 일이 한국 외교의 또 다른 도전이 되고 있다. 하지만, 체계적이고 영속적인 대미 의회 외교 전략 수립을 위한 연구가 부족하다. 이런 맥락에서 본 연구는 성공적인 대미 의회 외교 전략을 제언하고자 한다. 의회는 행정부와는 달리 집합적 행위자라는 사실에 착안하여, 지속적이고 체계적인 대미 의회 외교 전략 수립을 위한 출발점으로 우선 미국 의회의 정책 네트워크에 주목한다. 정책 중심의 네트워크는 기존의 소셜미디어/상임위원회 중심의 네트워크 분석이 직면하는 문제에서 상대적으로 자유롭기 때문이다. Stochastic Degree Sequence Model(SDSM)로 제117대 미국 연방의회(2021-22)의원들 간 정
최근 미·중 경쟁이 격화되고 경제 안보가 화두로 떠오른 맥락에서 미국 바이든 정부 는 입법 정치를 통한 외교 정책 형성에 주력하고 있다. 미국 의회가 법으로 통과시키는 미국 대외 정책은 그 파급력을 무시하기 어렵기 때문에 미국 의회의 동향을 민감하게 파 악하고 대응책을 세우는 일이 한국 외교의 또 다른 도전이 되고 있다. 하지만, 체계적이고 영속적인 대미 의회 외교 전략 수립을 위한 연구가 부족하다. 이런 맥락에서 본 연구 는 성공적인 대미 의회 외교 전략을 제언하고자 한다. 의회는 행정부와는 달리 집합적 행위자라는 사실에 착안하여, 지속적이고 체계적인 대미 의회 외교 전략 수립을 위한 출발점으로 우선 미국 의회의 정책 네트워크에 주목한다. 정책 중심의 네트워크는 기존의 소셜미디어/상임위원회 중심의 네트워크 분석이 직면하는 문제에서 상대적으로 자유롭기 때문이다. Stochastic Degree Sequence Model(SDSM)로 제117대 미국 연방의회(2021-22) 의원들 간