Sumi Jung
Yonsei University · 経営学
研究室紹介
Professor Sumi Jung's research lab focuses on corporate governance, executive compensation, and the interplay between political connections and financial reporting. Her work explores how institutional and legal changes—such as the staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine—affect managerial incentives, risk-taking behavior, and earnings management. She also investigates how managerial ability influences tax strategy adjustments and how political appointments can lead to strategic income smoothing to mitigate political scrutiny. Her research combines empirical industrial organization with corporate finance and accounting, often using quasi-experimental designs to identify causal effects.
Research Overview
Research Output Trend
Figures are computed from collected data and may differ slightly.
Selected Papers
15ABSTRACT Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEO compensation structure. The IDD adoption constrains executives' ability to work for competitors, which likely decreases CEOs' tendency to take risks by increasing the cost of job loss and reducing the reward to risk taking. We expect the board to respond by increasing the sensitivity of C
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how firms receiving benefits through their connections to politicians use accounting discretion to mitigate the costs associated with negative publicity. I utilize a unique setting that captures the change in political costs arising from chairmanship appointments to influential U.S. Senate committees. Firms in the home state of a promoted officeholder often receive preferential treatment, drawing public scrutiny and incentivizing them to avoid reporti
Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEO compensation structure. The IDD adoption constrains executives’ ability to work for competitors, which likely decreases CEOs’ tendency to take risks by increasing the cost of job loss and reducing the reward to risk taking. We expect the board to respond by increasing the sensitivity of CEO wealth
University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. July 2015. Major: Business Administration. Advisor: Pervin Shroff. 1 computer file (PDF); iv, 60 pages.
Recently, most of the stock markets all over the world have ever experienced the worst situation since the great depression of 1929. Some of the stock market indices have dropped down to the half of the indices achieved in October of 2007. This kind of rapid downfalls in the stock markets has been happening in the southeastern Asia including Korea and Chine. With this in mind, we tried to figure out how to make the sound investment in stocks from a decision-making theorist perspective. To this e
Highlighting managerial ability as a moderator of tax adjustment behaviour, this study finds that firms led by more capable managers exhibit slower adjustment speed of tax avoidance towards the optimal level. Furthermore, our findings remain robust after employing the propensity score matching and instrumental variable approaches. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the negative association between managerial ability and tax avoidance adjustment speed is stronger for firms facing larger transa
ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of financial statement comparability on asymmetric cost behavior, commonly known as cost stickiness. Using a comprehensive U.S. sample (1999–2020), we document a positive association between greater comparability and increased cost stickiness. The relationship is markedly stronger for firms facing high uncertainty and for firms whose analyst forecasts are less accurate or more dispersed. We also find that higher comparability notably raises the likelihood
We examine the impact of managerial litigation risk on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We use an exogenous shock, a change in Nevada’s corporate law, which significantly lowers managers’ legal liability between 1991 and 2013, to implement a difference-in-differences design. We find that firms incorporated in Nevada significantly increased CSR after the law change, suggesting that the external pressure imposed by potential litigation discourages managers from engaging in CSR activities. Th
This paper examines the impact of litigation risk on accounting conservatism using the two-phase enactment of Securities Class Action in Korea. Using the sample of firms listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2002 to 2010, we demonstrate that the increased legal risk subsequent to the implementation of Securities Class Action encourages managers to adopt a more conservative financial reporting. In addition, we find that the increase in accounting conservatism following Securities Class Action enactment