Taehee Whang

Why do we observe economic sanctions despite strong doubts regarding their effectiveness? While the symbolic use of sanctions is advanced as an alternative to the instrumental use explanation, no one has assessed this alternative explanation empirically. I investigate the symbolic use of sanctions for domestic political gain in the United States, assessing in particular the effect of sanctions imposition on US presidential approval ratings. Findings suggest that policymakers benefit from imposin

This article explores when and why sanction threats succeed in extracting concessions from the targeted country. We focus on two different, albeit not mutually exclusive, mechanisms that can explain the success of sanction threats. The first mechanism relates to incomplete information regarding the sanctioner's determination to impose sanctions and suggests that threats help to extract concessions by revealing the sanctioner's resolve. The second mechanism underscores the direct impact of common

Abstract When are economic sanctions expected to succeed? Previous studies predict that sanctions will be more effective when the issue at stake is important, when the sender and target are allied, when the target’s domestic institutions are more democratic, and when the target’s economy is dependent on the sender’s. This article subjects these explanations to an empirical test using a new fully structural estimation that employs a game theoretic model as a statistical model. The initiation and

Objectives In this study, we develop a model based on big data analysis to find patterns in North Korean nuclear provocations. Methods Using automated text analysis classification through supervised machine learning techniques, we analyze the North Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) from 1997 to 2013. Results We find an interesting difference between the Kim Jong‐il era and the Kim and Jong‐un period, implying a major shift in the nuclear policy of Pyongyang. While Kim Jong‐il, who had a firm gri

Do economic sanctions serve international signaling purposes? A fully structural statistical model that employs a signaling game as a statistical model is used to investigate the existence of signaling effects of sanctions. Estimation results suggest that sanctions fail to work as a costly signal. The cheapness of sanctions prevents a target state from being able to distinguish a resolute sender state from a sender who is bluffing. When sanctions are imposed, a target rarely updates its initial

Signaling models are ubiquitous in political science. An essential characteristic of these models is that actors can update their beliefs about their opponents. An actor observes the behavior of his opponent, and this behavior functions as a signal that allows the actor to learn more about his opponent's true “type.” As a result, the actor is able to adapt his own behavior. Current statistical models of strategic choice based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, however, allow for very little, if an

Sanctions restrict or terminate economic relations between two or more countries, directly and negatively influencing sanctioned countries’ companies. We argue that sanctions are similar to recessions—both reduce economic activity in affected countries. Less economic activity results in a lower accident risk as companies use their productive facilities less. Reduced revenues also force companies to adjust by cutting costs, which includes spending on safety. Hence, accident damage should increase

Why do donors continue to provide foreign aid despite its failure to help poor countries over the past several decades? While some scholars argue that foreign aid is purely for humanitarian purposes, others assert that such aid serves as a tool to pressure recipient countries into accepting policy concessions. In this study, we subject these arguments to empirical testing using a dataset that integrates the amount of US aid and economic policies of recipient countries for 1995–2012. The findings

For the past two decades, North Korea has made a series of military provocations, destabilizing the regional security of East Asia. In particular, Pyongyang has launched several conventional attacks on South Korea. Although these attacks seem unpredictable and random, we attempt in this article to find some patterns in North Korean provocations. To this end, we employ a machine-learning technique to analyze news articles of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) from 1997 to 2013. Based on five k

What is the relationship between economic sanctions and the human rights conditions of target countries? We suggest a two-stage mechanism to explain how sanctions deteriorate the human rights condition in the target country. In the repressive capacity stage, sanctions increase the capacity the target government can use for political repression. We introduce the concepts of political corruption, judicial dependence, and the government's media censorship as political repression tools of target gov

Abstract Do political institutions matter in explaining how economic sanctions are used? The current understanding of sanctions imposed by non-democratic sender countries is limited in the literature, as existing theories predominantly focus on the behaviors and strategies of democratic sender countries, leaving a notable gap in systematic comprehension. Using the existing dataset on sanctions, we theoretically and empirically distinguished characteristics of sanctions by non-democracies in term

본 논문은 국제관계를 중심으로 널리 사용되는 경험적 방법론인 이산선택모형의 문제점과 대안을 살펴본다. 로짓(logit)이나 프로빗(probit) 등의 이산선택모형은 행위자들의 선호와 그들의 선택들이 가져오는 최종결과 사이에 존재하는 전략적 선택이나 그로 인한 데이터의 편중현상을 생략함으로써 추론에 문제를 가져올 수 있다. 구조적 통계모형은 선호와 결과를 가정하지 않고 게임이론을 통해 선호와 결과 사이의 전략적 선택과정을 내면화한 통계모델을 제시한다. 게임이론과 경험적 방법론의 결합이라고 볼 수 있는데 이론적으로만 다뤄지던 전략적 선택, 표본 편중, 혹은 신호의 신뢰성이나 신뢰갱신 등 이론단계에서 추상적으로 다뤄져왔던 여러 국제관계의 설명요소들을 경험적으로도 연구할 수 있다는 장점이 있다. 구체적으로 구조적 통계모형의 한 예인 private information 모형을 소개한다.

President G.W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has been rated as one of the successful US aid interventions of recent decades. We investigate the impact of PEPFAR on economic development, democracy, and human rights by comparing focus countries that received PEPFAR with other countries that did not receive PEPFAR from 2003 to 2008. Moreover, we examine specific changes made within focus countries after the implementation of PEPFAR using Difference-in-Difference estimation. Our res