Woon‐Oh Jung

David B. Smith, An Investigation of Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation of Auditor Change Disclosures: The Case of Accounting Series Release No. 165, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 134-145

Abstract In Korea, controlling shareholders in general tend to transfer their shares to their family members or related parties. In this paper, we investigate whether Korean controlling shareholders attempt to influence stock prices by managing the timing of information disclosures when they transfer stocks to related parties as gifts. Because gift taxes are levied based on the average market value of the stock transferred for a certain period known as the valuation period , controlling sharehol

We investigate the effect of debt financing on the voluntary adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by unlisted firms and such adoption’s effect on bond credit rating. We find that unlisted firms with public debts are more likely to voluntarily adopt IFRS. Subsequent to the voluntary application of IFRS, the unlisted firms exhibit, on average, enhanced credit ratings. These findings suggest that the public debt market’s demand for high-quality financial reporting may

Abstract. This paper presents a stylized game‐theoretic model in which inventory accounting choices of firms convey proprietary information to their competitors, and hence those choices are strategically made. The model provides a rationale for the use of FIFO by some firms, foregoing significant amounts of tax benefits which could be captured by the use of LIFO. An explanation is also given for negative market reactions to LIFO adoptions documented by most of the empirical studies of LIFO/FIFO

In Korea, there is a general tendency for controlling shareholders to transfer the ownership of their companies to the next generation. In this paper, we investigate whether Korean controlling shareholders attempt to influence stock prices when they transfer stock to related parties as gifts. Because gift taxes are levied based on the average market value of the stock transferred for a certain period known as the valuation period, controlling shareholders may have incentives to depress the stock

Abstract This study investigates the economic impact of the financial regulations that aimed to control the housing market in K orea during the reign of late P resident R o's A dministration, which had diligently fought against the then speculative bubble in the K orean real‐estate market. We test for the validity of the general prediction that the financial regulations in the form of the loan‐to‐value ( LTV ) and debt‐to‐income ( DTI ) restrictions would have adverse impacts on the value of the

Prior studies present the competing hypotheses for the role of related-party transactions (RPT). “Efficiency enhancing view” argues that firms engage in RPT with intent to reduce transaction costs in an imperfect market. On the other hand, “tunneling view” posits that RPT is a viable channel for transferring the wealth within a business group into the ultimate shareholders. From the tunneling view, the Korean regulators have had long concerns over abnormal levels of related-party sales (RPS), an