Youngwoo Koh
Seoul National University · 意思決定科学
研究室紹介
Professor Youngwoo Koh's research lab specializes in wireless communication systems, with a focus on energy-efficient network design and resource allocation in wireless powered communication networks (WPCNs). The lab investigates innovative signal design techniques—such as downlink power level modulation—for conveying scheduling information while simultaneously transferring energy. Their work integrates principles from convex optimization, nonlinear material modeling (e.g., Yoshida-Uemori model), and finite element analysis to address both communication and mechanical performance in emerging wireless systems. The lab's research bridges wireless communications, energy harvesting, and computational mechanics, aiming to optimize system capacity and reliability.
Research Overview
Research Output Trend
Figures are computed from collected data and may differ slightly.
Selected Papers
15We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students’ attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on school-specific attributes such as essays. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alle
Spring-back of MS1470 steel sheets was numerically predicted using a non-linear kinematic hardening material behavior based on the Yoshida-Uemori model. From uniaxial tension and uniaxial tension-compression-tension data as well as the uniaxial tension-unloading-tension data, the parameters of the Yoshida-Uemori model were obtained. For the numerical simulations, the Yoshida-Uemori model was implemented into the commercial finite element program, ABAQUS/Explicit and ABAQUS/Standard using the use
Abstract We study wars of attrition with spending constraints. Specifically, there are two players with different values of the prize and costs of continuing wars, and they are endowed with limited budgets that can be used during the war. Two players compete by choosing the time at which they intend to give up within the constraints. We find the constrained mixed strategy equilibrium for this model and provide a full characterization of equilibrium depending on whether each player's constraint i
This dissertation consists of three essays on market design and auction theory. In the first chapter, we develop a model of decentralized college admissions in which students' preferences for colleges are uncertain, and colleges must incur costs when their enrollments exceed their capacities. Colleges' admission decisions then become a tool for strategic yield management, because the enrollment at a college depends on not only students' uncertain preferences but also other colleges' admission de