이주성 교수
Joo-Sung Lee
성균관대학교 경제학과 · 의사결정과학
연구실 소개
이주성 교수의 연구실은 조직 내 지식 공유, 네트워크 기반 협상, 순차적 탐색 전략, 그리고 비공식적 연결을 통한 메커니즘 설계 등 사회적 상호작용과 기술적 구조가 복합적으로 작용하는 환경에서의 의사결정 및 행동을 연구합니다. 특히 공공기관과 교육기관에서의 지식 기여 동기, 네트워크 구조가 협상 효율성에 미치는 영향, 사용자 참여를 유도하는 환경 캠페인 설계 등 실질적 사회 문제 해결을 목표로 합니다. 이론적 기반으로는 사회자본 이론, 게임 이론, 행동경제학을 적극 활용하며, 실증적 데이터와 실험적 설계를 통해 실천 가능한 정책 및 전략을 도출합니다.
연구 현황
연구 성과 추이
표시된 성과는 수집된 데이터 기준으로 산출되며, 일부 차이가 있을 수 있습니다.
주요 논문
15Knowledge sharing has multifaceted effects on organizations, such as improving work performance, among which creativity is apparently one of the most important parts. Nevertheless, the effects of knowledge sharing on individuals has not been paid attention sufficiently by previous research. Furthermore, knowledge sharing research mainly concerns business organizations rather than public organizations. This study aims to examine the effects of knowledge sharing on individuals in a higher institut
We introduce a new noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for network-restricted environments in which players can bargain only with their neighbors. The main theorem characterizes a condition on network structures for efficient equilibria. If the underlying network is either complete or circular, an efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all discount factors—all the players always try to reach an agreement as soon as practicable, and hence no strategic delay occurs. I
Abstract This article studies sequential search problems, where a searcher chooses search intensity adaptively in each period. We fully characterize the optimal search rule and value, decomposing the intertemporal change of search intensity into the fall‐back value effect and the deadline effect. We show that the optimal search intensity (value) is submodular (supermodular) in fall‐back value and time. It follows that the fall‐back value effect increases when the deadline approaches, and the dea
We study mechanisms for environments in which only some of the agents are directly connected to a mechanism designer and the other agents can participate in a mechanism only through the connected agents' referrals. Agents' network connections are private information, which can be strategically concealed by avoiding making referrals; while the mechanism designer wants to elicit the agents' private information about both payoff types and network connections. The set of feasible allocations is endo
To plan a persuasive environmental campaign, it is important to tell consumers environmental messages in an engaging manner, to encourage user participation. To explore the effective approaches to storytelling for environmental innovation, this study analyzes how varying interaction modes based on the interactivity levels of user participation framework influence people’s response to an environmental mission such as planting trees. This research has developed and employed various forms of intera
I introduce a noncooperative coalitional bargaining model for characteristic function form games. A player not only buys out other players' resources and rights with upfront transfers as in Gul (Econometrica, 1989), but also strategically chooses partners instead of bargaining with a randomly selected opponent. Such transactions among players are interpreted as coalition formation. The main theorem provides a general inefficiency result. If a characteristic function form game has a strict subcoa
This article studies a seller's compound search for bidders by a deadline. We show that the optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequence of second‐price auctions, characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensities (sample sizes) over time. The monotonicity results are robust in both cases of short‐lived and long‐lived bidders. Furthermore, a seller with short‐lived bidders sets lower reserve prices and searches more intensively than one with long‐lived bidder
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