강문성 교수

This paper proves theoretically that bilateral trade between South and North Korea, between whom many political barriers to trade exist, is Pareto‐inefficient, and that a Pareto‐efficient situation can be achieved through the attainment of institutional economic integration, enabled by mutual agreement between South and North Korea. Based on our theoretical analysis, we propose a comprehensive economic integration agreement as an instrumental framework for the gradual integration of South and No

Abstract This paper analyses strategic R&D policy under circumstances where intellectual property rights protection resulting from firms' R&D investment is not perfect. By examining policy choices wherein a government chooses both R&D subsidies and IPR protection levels simultaneously, we show that it is optimal for a government to adopt sufficiently weak IPR protection and to subsidize R&D investments of domestic firms. Inducing R&D investment of foreign rival firms will inc

Abstract We attempted to find whether the Korea's growth‐driven trade policies during the period of its industrialisation has contributed to output growth together with income distribution by qualitatively analysing the performance of trade policies interacting with the multilateral trading system over time. In addition, we conducted a regression analysis to investigate the effect of Korea's trade growth on inclusive growth during its industrialisation period covering the period of 1976–2011. We

Like the original Spencer-Brander result, the R&D incentives that we identify lead governments to set positive R&D subsides in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, we find that if exporting governments could cooperate over their policy choices they would continue to subsidize R&D, rather than agreeing to tax R&D as in the original Spencer-Brander set-up. The reason is that under cooperation they will also agree to share perfectly the results of R&D investments (i.e., eliminate IPR protectio

This paper analyzes the economic impacts of Jordan's regional trade agreements on its major strategic industries. We calculate each individual industry's revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index to identify Jordan's strategic industries showing comparative advantages. And then we analyze each individual industry's export performance before and after its regional trade agreements have entered into force. This paper found that the bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between Jordan and the Unite

This paper is useful in that it succeeds in identifying and characterizing the interesting effects that exogenous variation in the degree of IPR protection can have on standard strategic trade policy arguments. In pointing out the importance of the IPR regime for understanding, the incentives to subsidize R&D, and even for predicting the sign of the optimal strategic R&D policy , we also set the stage of future research, which models the joint determination of R&D subsides and IPR regime.

This article analyses industry-specific effects of Antidumping (AD) activities on trade, using the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in dynamic panel date models. In the process of doing so, this article selected three frequent AD users, such as the US, the European Union (EU) and China. Additionally, we chose the metal/steel, chemical and plastic/rubber industries for the US cases; chemical, metal/steel and machinery/electronics industries for the EU cases; and the chemical industry fo

This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain why governments seek restrictions on IPR protection and allow R&D subsidies through multilateral trade agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. After 7 years of discussion, the Uruguay Round extends GATTs trade-liberalizing philosophy to worldwide use of subsidies as a secondary means to intervene in international trade. Through the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures t

We provide economic backgrounds to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under the World Trade Organization. Permitting R&D subsidy under Article 8 of the Agreement can be interpreted as an inefficient victory of an individual exporting country in the non-cooperative game, harnessing strategic relationship over a foreign rival firm into its domestic industrial policy. In addition, we show that the expiration of Article 8 can be understood as a result of the global optimum, where

Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Subsidy Policy for Foreign Direct Investment-Foreign direct investment, Multinational enterprises, Strategic investment policy, Knowledge spillovers, Intellectual property rights