유승한 교수

This paper presents a model-based fault detection and isolation technique for automotive yaw moment control system. For this purpose, a novel fault detection and isolation algorithm for a class of actuator-plant systems is proposed. Compared with the existing fault detection and isolation techniques that can only isolate a target fault or require multiple observers to isolate multiple faults, a unique strength of the proposed algorithm is its ability to isolate faults at the component level sole

A platform offers sellers and buyers trading opportunities by creating one-to-one matches between them. A matching mechanism specifies subscription fees and the probabilities with which each seller type is matched with each buyer type. When the subscribers are fully strategic in their interactions with their matched partners, the optimal mechanism may not employ socially efficient positive assortative matching (PAM) but instead focus on the extraction of the agents' informational rents. In alter

A 22-year-old woman visited our clinic with a history of radiofrequency volumetric reduction for bilateral masseter muscles at a local medical clinic. Six days after the radiofrequency procedure, she noticed a facial asymmetry during smiling. Physical examination revealed immobility of the mouth drawing upward and laterally on the left. Routine nerve conduction studies and needle electromyography (EMG) in facial muscles did not suggest electrodiagnostic abnormalities. We assumed that the cause o

We examine free riding for entry deterrence in license auctions with heterogeneous incumbents. We establish the monotonicity of randomized preemptive bidding equilibria: an incumbent with a higher entry-loss rate has greater free-riding incentive, choosing a lower deterring probability. We then identify conditions for the existence of a series of fully or partially participating equilibria such that two or more incumbents with bounded heterogeneity in their entry-loss rates participate in random

Each seller's quality, not associated with a contractible action, making a contract incomplete, a principal seeks a better-informed auctioneer to tackle the problem. To induce the auctioneer's truthful quality reports for multiple sellers, the principal constructs the first-order absolute alignment that is aligned with a benchmark's absolute criterion. The optimal compensation for the auctioneer highlights a new role for reserve prices as a revelation device. In addition, we design a practical a

This paper offers a model in which there is direct competition between different groups. We deliberately endow an environment with many employers and workers in which opportunities are limited such that each employer is randomly matched with two workers from the entire worker population, which consists of two ex ante identical sub-groups, and selects at most one of them. We show that with the competition, a set of feasible equilibria has a con.ict structure unlike the conflict-free structure fou

Statistical discrimination explains that two ex ante identical groups can have two different qualifications due to asymmetric information and self-fulfilling equilibria. In the typical statistical discrimination models, however, there is no interaction between groups. This paper offers a statistical discrimination model with a continuous signaling in which two groups compete for employment. We compare exclusive equilibria, in which no worker in one group makes a human capital investment, with symm

A principal sells an influence to firms that may undertake a project, through collusion with a seller of some item. For the optimal sale of influence, the principal chooses an influence level for a losing firm above the default level, while treating a winning firm even more favorably. Furthermore, the difference in influence between two firms does not change monotonically, and under some parameters, even the set of firm types participating in the sale is larger. The optimal mechanism highlights

This paper generalizes the canonical feature of signaling models that signaling costs are negatively correlated with productive capabilities. A worker has two characteristics - signaling cost (low/high) and productive capability (low/high) - each combination of which can be realized with positive probability. The main results identify one key condition to guarantee the existence of a unique (partially) separating equilibrium. This finding has new implications for the role of education or a pre-s