유승호 교수

This study investigates pricing and return policies under various supply contracts in a closed-loop supply chain in which a supplier has more bargaining power than a retailer. We develop integrated supply contract models based on the principal–agent paradigm. Specifically, the supplier with more bargaining power devises a supply contract, acting as a Stackelberg leader. Then, given the contract offer, the retailer decides on pricing and return policies which affect consumers’ demand and return b

This study is the first investigating the effect of supply chain structure and players’ power dynamics on a supply chain’s R&D and market performances. We consider a three-stage supply chain, consisting of a R&D firm, a manufacturer, and a seller. We develop six supply chain models based on various structures and power dynamics, and reveal important implications by comparing the models. R&D performance is a function of supply chain structure; an integrated supply chain can expect imp

ABSTRACT This study investigates a final assembler's (FA) incentive strategies for quality management in the multitier supply chain context. FAs often decide to manage a second‐tier supplier in a reactive way when the first‐tier supplier is unable to control the former. In our model, an FA proactively looks upstream to its first‐tier (S1) and second‐tier (S2) suppliers in a three‐tier supply chain. We develop four proactive strategies with incentives and one reactive strategy with no incentive.