송원준 교수

Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn to strategies that do not require substantial eli

Abstract Most major nonviolent civil resistance campaigns target autocratic regimes. Yet, most dictators are toppled by their close supporters, not civilian protesters. Building on theories of strategic interactions between leaders, security agents, and protesters, we make three core claims: first, protesters are relatively less likely to mount a major nonviolent uprising against dictatorships with personalized security forces; secondly, personalized security forces are more likely to repress re

The North Korean regime is unique among dictatorships because it is both long-lasting and highly personalized. We argue that initial factionalization of the regime, coupled with the presence of multiple foreign backers early in the regime, allowed the first leader to personalize the regime by first wresting power from the military and then subsequently curbing the autonomous power of the Korean Worker's Party. Using a measure of personalism constructed from historical data, we trace the consolid

Dictators rely on coercive forces to remain in office, as violence is the ultimate arbiter of power in these regimes. However, coercive forces also can remove the dictator from office in a coup. This presents the dictator with a dilemma. One way to address this dilemma is to personalize the security forces. This paper argues that personalizing the security forces decreases coup risk by: (a) linking the security elites’ fate more closely to the leader’s and (b) increasing the informational advant

Dictators shape regime structures to counter the threats they face. Personalization entails the progressive accumulation of power in the hands of the dictator to minimize internal threats from organized elites in the military and party. However, elites have incentives to resist the personalization to avoid being marginalized by personalist strongmen. We argue that as personalism increases, rival elites, less able to coordinate coup attempts, turn to strategies that do not require substantial eli

본 논문은 권위주의 체제의 수립 방식이 차후 정권의 안정성에 끼치는 영향을 분석한다. 많은 연구가 각 나라의 체제나 특성 요인이 안정성을 얼마나 설명하는지 보기 위해 쿠데타나 군부 숙청 여부를 관련시켰다. 정권의 형성 이후 요인에 중점을 둔 기존의 연구와 달리 본 연구는 정권 형성 과정 또한 이후의 안정성에 영향을 주리라는 가능성에 초점을 맞추었다. 구체적으로 무장 반군에 의한 정권 수립의 경우 그렇지 않은 정권에 비해 더 안정적인 민군관계를 누린다는 가설을 검증해보려 했다. 이를 위하여 1946년부터 2010년까지 280개 권위주의 체제의 수립 방식과 군사쿠데타 및 군부 숙청이 어떠한 관계를 가지는지 분석하였다. 양적 분석의 결과, 무장 반군을 통한 권위주의 체제 수립은 차후 군사 쿠데타의 가능성을 감소시키는 것으로 나타난다. 이러한 결과는 체제전복을 목적으로 지닌 쿠데타 시도(regime change coup)의 감소에 따른 것으로 지도자교체만을 목적으로 한 쿠데타 시도(lead

This article investigates why some former authoritarian ruling parties survive and succeed after democratic transitions, while others decline. We argue that parties formed before the onset of authoritarian rule (“pre-seizure” parties) are better positioned to endure and compete under democracy than those established after authoritarian consolidation (“post-seizure” parties). Pre-seizure parties, having developed strong party brands independent of authoritarian resource advantages, are more resil

Dictators rely on coercive forces to remain in office, as violence is the ultimate arbiter of power in these regimes. However, coercive forces also can remove the dictator from office in a coup. This presents the dictator with a dilemma. One way to address this dilemma is to personalize the security forces. This paper argues that personalizing the security forces decreases coup risk by: (a) linking the security elites' fate more closely to the leader's and (b) increasing the informational advant

Although research has explored censorship and foreign media consumption in authoritarian regimes, less is known about who chooses to violate censorship laws. Using data from North Korean refugees resettled in South Korea (2010–2019), we investigate the predictors of such violations. North Korea, where they can carry the death penalty, provides a critical case for understanding broader authoritarian contexts. We test three main predictors: economic independence from the state; college education;

본 연구는 서번트 리더십이 부하의 상사 신뢰와 조직 시민 행동에 미치는 영향과 재택근무 비율이 이 관계를 어떻게 조절하는지를 확인하였다. 연구 결과, 관계 중심 서번트 리더십은 직접적으로 그리고 부하의 상사 신뢰를 매개해서도 조직 시민 행동에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났으며, 관계 중심 서번트 리더십과 조직 시민행동의 관계에서 재택근무 비율이 유의한 양(+)의 직접적 조절 효과가 있음을 확인했다. 반면, 문제 해결 중심서번트 리더십은 조직 시민 행동과 부하의 상사 신뢰에 영향력을 미치지 않았으나, 문제 해결 중심 서번트 리더십이 재택근무 비율의 조절을 받아서 부하의 상사 신뢰에 양(+)의 관계를 맺고 있다는 점과 문제 해결중심 서번트 리더십과는 관계없이, 부하의 상사 신뢰가 조직 시민 행동에 영향을 미치고 있음을 확인하였다. 즉, 부하의 상사 신뢰는 조직 시민 행동과 밀접한 관련성을 가지고 있으므로, 이는 부하의 조직 헌신을 위해 상사는 부하가 자신을 신뢰할 수 있게 만드는 것이 중

Most major nonviolent civil resistance campaigns target autocratic regimes. Yet most dictators are toppled by their close supporters, not civilian protesters. Building on theories of strategic interactions between leaders, security agents, and protesters, we make three core claims. First, protesters are relatively less likely to mount a major nonviolent uprising against dictatorships with personalized security forces. Second, personalized security forces are more likely to repress realized prote