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[Paper Review] Incentivized Delivery Network of IoT Software Updates Based on Trustless Proof-of-Distribution

Oded Leiba, Yechiav Yitzchak|arXiv (Cornell University)|May 11, 2018
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security4 citations
TL;DR

This paper proposes a decentralized, incentivized IoT software update delivery network using blockchain-based smart contracts and zero-knowledge contingent payments (ZKCP) to ensure trustless, fair compensation for distributors. By binding vendor commitments to micropayments via smart contracts and using ZKCP to generate unforgeable proof-of-distribution, the system enables scalable, secure, and auditable delivery of security updates without relying on centralized infrastructure or trusting intermediaries.

ABSTRACT

The prevalence of IoT devices makes them an ideal target for attackers. To reduce the risk of attacks vendors routinely deliver security updates (patches) for their devices. The delivery of security updates becomes challenging due to the issue of scalability as the number of devices may grow much quicker than vendors' distribution systems. Previous studies have suggested a permissionless and decentralized blockchain-based network in which nodes can host and deliver security updates, thus the addition of new nodes scales out the network. However, these studies do not provide an incentive for nodes to join the network, making it unlikely for nodes to freely contribute their hosting space, bandwidth, and computation resources. In this paper, we propose a novel decentralized IoT software update delivery network in which participating nodes referred to as distributors) are compensated by vendors with digital currency for delivering updates to devices. Upon the release of a new security update, a vendor will make a commitment to provide digital currency to distributors that deliver the update; the commitment will be made with the use of smart contracts, and hence will be public, binding, and irreversible. The smart contract promises compensation to any distributor that provides proof-of-distribution, which is unforgeable proof that a single update was delivered to a single device. A distributor acquires the proof-of-distribution by exchanging a security update for a device signature using the Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) trustless data exchange protocol. Eliminating the need for trust between the security update distributor and the security consumer (IoT device) by providing fair compensation, can significantly increase the number of distributors, thus facilitating rapid scale out.

Motivation & Objective

  • To address the scalability and availability challenges of centralized IoT software update distribution in rapidly growing device ecosystems.
  • To solve the free-rider problem in decentralized update networks by introducing economic incentives for nodes to contribute bandwidth, storage, and computation.
  • To eliminate trust between distributors and IoT devices through a fair exchange mechanism using zero-knowledge contingent payments (ZKCP).
  • To enable vendors to monitor update delivery, prioritize critical patches, and ensure software integrity via blockchain-verified proofs.
  • To design a system that is highly available, auditable, and compatible with existing blockchain platforms like Ethereum.

Proposed method

  • The system uses smart contracts on a public blockchain to bind vendor commitments to micropayments for delivering updates to specific IoT devices.
  • Distributors earn compensation only after providing unforgeable proof-of-distribution, which is generated via the Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) protocol.
  • ZKCP enables trustless exchange: a distributor sends the update, and the IoT device signs a challenge to generate a proof that the update was delivered.
  • The proof-of-distribution is cryptographically verifiable and can be published on the blockchain to claim payment, ensuring fairness and irreversibility.
  • The system leverages zk-SNARKs to ensure that only a correct delivery results in a valid proof, with negligible probability of forgery.
  • Optimizations include batched transactions and public key indexing to reduce blockchain storage and transaction load.

Experimental results

Research questions

  • RQ1How can a decentralized IoT update network achieve high availability and scalability without relying on centralized infrastructure?
  • RQ2How can economic incentives be effectively modeled to ensure active participation of non-vendor nodes in distributing updates?
  • RQ3Can a trustless exchange protocol like ZKCP be used to eliminate the need for trust between distributors and IoT devices while ensuring fair compensation?
  • RQ4What mechanisms ensure the integrity and authenticity of software updates in a permissionless, decentralized network?
  • RQ5How can the system be auditable and extensible to support vendor-specific priorities such as critical patching or client-specific delivery?

Key findings

  • The system enables a scalable, fault-tolerant, and highly available IoT update delivery network by decentralizing distribution across incentivized nodes.
  • Proof-of-distribution is cryptographically unforgeable with negligible probability, ensuring that only valid deliveries qualify for payment.
  • Smart contracts on the blockchain enforce vendor commitments irreversibly, guaranteeing that distributors are paid only upon successful delivery.
  • The use of ZKCP ensures a fair exchange: distributors are paid only if they deliver the update, and devices only sign if they receive it.
  • The system supports programmable incentives, allowing vendors to prioritize certain updates or clients through smart contract logic.
  • Despite blockchain's current transaction limits, optimizations like batched transactions and signature aggregation can significantly reduce overhead and improve scalability.

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This review was created by AI and reviewed by human editors.