[Paper Review] International cooperation and competition in orbit-use management

Aditya Jain, Akhil Rao|arXiv (Cornell University)|May 8, 2022

Space Satellite Systems and Control4 citations

TL;DR

This paper develops a game-theoretic model showing that national regulatory policies on satellite operations—especially when tied to market access—can create a global regulatory equilibrium that reduces space debris and supports self-enforcing international treaties to avert Kessler Syndrome. A large legacy debris stock incentivizes all nations to regulate their satellite fleets, making international cooperation both feasible and mutually beneficial under open access.

ABSTRACT

Orbit-use management efforts can be structured as binding national regulatory policies or as self-enforcing international treaties. New treaties to control space debris growth appear unlikely in the near future. Spacefaring nations can pursue national regulatory policies, though regulatory competition and open access to orbit make their effectiveness unclear. We develop a game-theoretic model of national regulatory policies and self-enforcing international treaties for orbit-use management in the face of open access, regulatory competition, and catastrophe. While open access limits the effectiveness of national policies, market-access control ensures the policies can improve environmental quality. A large enough stock of legacy debris ensures existence of a global regulatory equilibrium where all nations choose to levy environmental regulations on all satellites. The global regulatory equilibrium supports a self-enforcing treaty to avert catastrophe by making it costlier to leave the treaty and free ride.

Motivation & Objective

• To analyze the interplay between national regulatory policies and international treaties in managing orbital debris under open access.
• To investigate how regulatory competition and open access affect the effectiveness of national policies in preventing self-sustaining debris growth.
• To determine under what conditions a self-enforcing international treaty on debris abatement can emerge and be sustained.
• To assess the role of legacy debris stock in enabling global regulatory coordination and incentive compatibility.
• To evaluate whether national policies can support international cooperation even without supranational enforcement.

Proposed method

• Develops a game-theoretic model of rational satellite operators and spacefaring nations under open access and risk of Kessler Syndrome.
• Models national regulatory policies as conditions for market access, creating incentives for compliance to maintain access to global satellite services.
• Analyzes a self-enforcing international treaty mechanism where nations commit to debris abatement, with exit costs making free-riding unattractive.
• Introduces a global regulatory equilibrium where all nations levy environmental regulations on all satellites as a market-access requirement.
• Uses a threshold-based catastrophe model to assess how uncertainty in the Kessler Syndrome tipping point affects treaty stability.
• Compares outcomes under national regulatory competition versus international treaty cooperation, focusing on environmental quality and economic value.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 Under what conditions can national regulatory policies effectively reduce space debris despite regulatory competition and open access?
• RQ2 How does a large stock of legacy debris influence the emergence of a global regulatory equilibrium?
• RQ3 Can bilateral national policies on market access support the formation of a self-enforcing international treaty to prevent Kessler Syndrome?
• RQ4 What role does the risk of a catastrophic tipping point play in enabling or hindering international cooperation on debris abatement?
• RQ5 How do national incentives for satellite services interact with global environmental goals under open-access orbital commons?

Key findings

• A large legacy debris stock ensures the existence of a global regulatory equilibrium where all nations impose environmental regulations on all satellites as a condition for market access.
• National regulatory policies that condition market access on compliance can improve environmental quality and reduce collision risk despite regulatory competition.
• Such a global regulatory equilibrium supports a self-enforcing international treaty by making it costly to exit and free-ride, thereby sustaining cooperation.
• The system of bilateral regulatory policies is incentive-compatible for all nations, eliminating the need for a supranational enforcer.
• Even under uncertainty about the Kessler Syndrome threshold, national policies can support international cooperation, as the incentives for regulation are independent of the exact tipping point.
• Open access to orbit makes national policies less effective in isolation, but market-access control restores their effectiveness and enables global coordination.