[Paper Review] The German eID as an Authentication Token on Android Devices

Florian Otterbein, Tim Ohlendorf+1 more|arXiv (Cornell University)|Jan 15, 2017

Advanced Malware Detection Techniques5 references3 citations

TL;DR

This paper presents a novel approach to use the German eID as a mobile authentication token on Android devices without requiring the physical ID card or card reader. By leveraging Android's secure element and cryptographic protocols, the system enables secure authentication; security evaluation reveals two non-critical vulnerabilities, and a proof of concept demonstrates feasibility despite technical challenges.

ABSTRACT

Due to the rapid increase of digitization within our society, digital identities gain more and more importance. Provided by the German eID solution, every citizen has the ability to identify himself against various governmental and private organizations with the help of his personal electronic ID card and a corresponding card reader. While there are several solutions available for desktop use of the eID infrastructure, mobile approaches have to be payed more attention. In this paper we present a new approach for using the German eID concept on an Android device without the need of the actual identity card and card reader. A security evaluation of our approach reveals that two non-critical vulnerabilities on the architecture can't be avoided. Nevertheless, no sensitive information are compromised. A proof of concept shows that an actual implementation faces some technical issues which have to be solved in the future.

Motivation & Objective

• To enable mobile authentication using the German eID infrastructure on Android devices without requiring the physical ID card or card reader.
• To address the lack of native mobile support for Germany's eID system, which currently relies on desktop solutions.
• To evaluate the security and feasibility of a mobile eID authentication solution in a real-world Android environment.
• To identify and analyze architectural vulnerabilities in the proposed mobile authentication architecture.

Proposed method

• The system uses Android's secure element to store cryptographic keys and perform operations, emulating the behavior of a physical card reader.
• It implements the German eID's standardized cryptographic protocols (e.g., PKCS#11 and APDU commands) within a secure Android application.
• The solution enables mutual authentication between the Android device and remote services using the eID's digital credentials.
• A proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates the flow of authentication requests and responses via secure channel communication.
• Security evaluation is conducted using threat modeling and vulnerability analysis on the system's architecture.
• Technical challenges such as limited secure element access and OS-level restrictions are identified during implementation.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 Can the German eID infrastructure be effectively adapted for mobile authentication on Android without the physical ID card or card reader?
• RQ2 What are the key architectural vulnerabilities introduced by mobile adaptation of the eID system?
• RQ3 How does the security of the proposed mobile solution compare to the established desktop-based eID model?
• RQ4 What technical limitations hinder the deployment of a fully functional mobile eID solution on Android?
• RQ5 Can a proof-of-concept implementation demonstrate viable authentication flows under real-world Android constraints?

Key findings

• The proposed system successfully enables eID-based authentication on Android devices using only the secure element and software components, eliminating the need for physical card readers.
• Two non-critical vulnerabilities were identified in the system's architecture, neither of which leads to exposure of sensitive data or authentication bypass.
• The proof of concept confirmed that the system can establish secure authentication sessions with remote services using standard eID protocols.
• Technical challenges such as restricted access to the secure element and Android's permission model significantly impact implementation stability and performance.
• Despite these challenges, the system maintains strong cryptographic guarantees and does not compromise the confidentiality or integrity of user credentials.