[Paper Review] Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms Standardization and Performance Analysis

Manish Kumar|arXiv (Cornell University)|Apr 6, 2022

Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture4 citations

TL;DR

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization efforts, evaluating the performance and feasibility of leading quantum-safe algorithms. It examines lattice-based, code-based, and isogeny-based schemes, highlighting trade-offs in key size, runtime memory, and CPU cycles, and concludes that while PQC algorithms are viable, significant optimization is needed for widespread deployment in real-world systems.

ABSTRACT

Quantum computer is no longer a hypothetical idea. It is the worlds most important technology and there is a race among countries to get supremacy in quantum technology. Its the technology that will reduce the computing time from years to hours or even minutes. The power of quantum computing will be a great support for the scientific community. However, it raises serious threats to cybersecurity. Theoretically, all the cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to attack. The practical quantum computers, when available with millions of qubits capacity, will be able to break nearly all modern public-key cryptographic systems. Before the quantum computers arrive with sufficient qubit capacity, we must be ready with quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, tools, techniques, and deployment strategies to protect the ICT infrastructure. This paper discusses in detail the global effort for the design, development, and standardization of various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms along with the performance analysis of some of the potential quantum-safe algorithms. Most of the quantum-safe algorithms need more CPU cycles, higher runtime memory, and large key size. The objective of the paper is to analyze the feasibility of the various quantum-safe cryptography algorithms.

Motivation & Objective

• To assess the global progress in standardizing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms.
• To evaluate the performance characteristics of leading PQC candidates, including key size, memory usage, and CPU cycles.
• To analyze the feasibility of deploying quantum-safe cryptography in existing ICT infrastructure.
• To identify performance bottlenecks and system-level challenges in adopting PQC algorithms.
• To support the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography before large-scale quantum computers become available.

Proposed method

• Systematic review of PQC standardization initiatives led by NIST and other international bodies.
• Performance benchmarking of selected PQC algorithms, including Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+.
• Analysis of computational overhead through key size, memory footprint, and execution time metrics.
• Comparison of algorithm families: lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, and isogeny-based cryptography.
• Evaluation of implementation efficiency across different hardware platforms and software environments.
• Synthesis of findings into feasibility assessments for real-world deployment.

Experimental results

Research questions

• RQ1 What are the current global efforts in standardizing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms?
• RQ2 How do the performance characteristics of leading PQC algorithms compare in terms of key size, memory usage, and CPU cycles?
• RQ3 What are the main system-level challenges in deploying quantum-safe cryptography in existing ICT infrastructure?
• RQ4 Which PQC algorithms show the most favorable trade-offs for practical deployment?
• RQ5 How ready are current PQC candidates for migration from classical to quantum-resistant cryptography?

Key findings

• Lattice-based schemes like Kyber and Dilithium show strong performance with moderate key sizes and efficient signing operations, making them strong candidates for standardization.
• Hash-based schemes such as SPHINCS+ offer strong security guarantees but require large public keys and high computational overhead, limiting their use in bandwidth-constrained environments.
• Isogeny-based schemes like SIKE and SIKE have been broken in practice, undermining their viability despite theoretical security.
• Code-based schemes such as BIKE and HQC demonstrate good security but suffer from large key sizes and high memory consumption, reducing practicality.
• Overall, PQC algorithms require significantly more CPU cycles and memory than classical cryptography, indicating a need for hardware and software optimization.
• The standardization process by NIST has advanced significantly, with Kyber, Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+ selected as finalists, signaling readiness for deployment in critical systems.